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A flourishing enterprise since the early 1970s, United States
Supreme Court exposition of capital punishment law under the
eighth amendment recently has fallen into a recession.
Legal forecasters saw the downturn coming as early as 1983. In
that year, as the Supreme Court approached its annual summer re-
cess, the justices handed down four decisions strongly portending a
cutback in the relatively rigorous federal oversight of capital punish-
ment to which the nation had become accustomed.' As we enter the
1990s, the substantial contraction of federal scrutiny of capital pun-
ishment foreshadowed by the 1983 decisions is very much upon us.
In just over twelve months' time during the late 1980s and early
1990s, the Supreme Court, despite stinging dissents, stripped the
lower federal courts of much of their power to give relief to death
row inmates except in the most egregious cases of constitutional er-
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law. B.A.
1979, University of North Carolina; J.D. 1982, Harvard Law School. I am grateful to
John Charles Boger, Michael L. Corrado, Donald T. Hornstein, Steven P. Litt, Michael'
A. Mello, Barry D. Nakell, and Benjamin B. Sendor for their helpful comments on earlier
versions of this article. I wish to acknowledge a particular debt of gratitude to Marshall
L. Dayan and Richard A. Rosen for the countless insights they offered at every stage of
this project.
1 The decisions were Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983) (affirming death sen-
tence despite use of unconstitutional aggravating circumstance); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463
U.S. 880 (1983) (approving expedited federal review of capital cases and upholding use
of speculative psychiatric testimony offered to support imposition of death sentence);
Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983) (affirming death sentence despite use of aggra-
vating circumstance in violation of state law); and California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992
(1983) (affirming death sentence where sentencing jury permitted to take into account
possibility of gubernatorial clemency in the event that defendant is sentenced to life
without parole). For what is probably the leading account of capital punishment law in
the Supreme Court, circa 1983, and a prescient estimation of the significance of the
1983 decisions, see Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 Sup. CT. REV. 305.
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ror.2 As if on a mission, the Court also used its certiorari power
liberally during the 1988 and 1989 Terms to clear the landscape of
most of the major unresolved eighth amendment capital punish-
ment questions that had been percolating in the lower courts. The
Court ruled against the defendant on almost every key point, again
over bitter dissents.a No one should be predicting significant ex-
pansions in eighth amendment capital punishment jurisprudence
anytime soon.
2 The majority accomplished this contraction of lower federal court power by re-
vamping the rules governing the retroactive application of the Court's decisions in
habeas corpus. Under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), and its rapidly increasing
progeny - including Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2822 (1990); Butler v. McKellar, 110 S.
Ct. 1212 (1990); and Saffle v. Parks, 110 S. Ct. 1257 (1990) - habeas corpus relief is
generally unavailable to defendants who seek to establish a deprivation of their constitu-
tional rights by relying upon a new rule of constitutional law that was not firmly settled
when their cases became final (that is, upon the conclusion of the direct appeal process,
including the passing of the time limit for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the
United States Supreme Court, see Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255, 258 n.1 (1986)). Be-
cause the phrase "new rule" is defined so broadly under the Teague line of cases, habeas
relief is for all intents and purposes available only when the state's denial of the peti-
tioner's claim of constitutional right was rationally indefensible. Indeed, "[t]he 'new
rule' principle.., validates reasonable, good-faith interpretations of existing precedents
made by state courts even though they are shown to be contrary to later decisions."
Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1217.
3 Foremost among the eighth amendment rulings from the 1988 and 1989 Terms
that went against the capital defendant are the following: Lewis v. Jeffers, 110 S. Ct.
3092 (1990) (affirming lenient standard for review of constitutional adequacy of aggra-
vating circumstances); Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047 (1990) (affirming placement
upon the defendant of the burden to establish mitigating circumstances sufficient to call
for a life sentence); Clemons v. Mississippi, 110 S. Ct. 1441 (1990) (holding for defend-
ant, but affirming propriety of appellate reweighing of aggravating and mitigating cir-
cumstances as means of curing trial-level error relating to capital sentencing); Saffle v.
Parks, 110 S. Ct. 1257 (1990) (holding that Constitution as construed to date does not
dictate that sentencer must be free to base its sentencing decision on the sympathy it
feels for the defendant after hearing mitigating evidence should it desire to do so);
Boyde v. California, 110 S. Ct. 1190 (1990) (upholding scheme that requires imposition
of death sentence where mitigating circumstances are outweighed by aggravating cir-
cumstances); Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 110 S. Ct. 1078 (1990) (upholding scheme that
mandates imposition of death sentence where aggravating circumstance but no mitigat-
ing circumstance exists); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (refusing to hold the
death penalty per se unconstitutional for the mentally retarded offender); and Stanford
v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (refusing to hold the death penalty per se unconstitu-
tional for the juvenile offender). Capital defendants did manage to secure a few victo-
ries, however, during the 1988 and 1989 Terms. See, e.g., McKoy v. North Carolina, 110
S. Ct. 1227 (1990) (holding unconstitutional a requirement of juror unanimity before
jury may consider mitigating circumstance; reaffirming Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367
(1988)); Gathers v. South Carolina, 490 U.S. 805 (1989) (states cannot allow factors
"wholly unrelated to the blameworthiness of a particular defendant" to be placed before
the sentencer in support of a death sentence; reaffirming Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S.
496 (1987)). But see Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991) (overruling Booth and
Gathers to the extent that those decisions held inadmissible evidence and argument relat-
ing to victim and impact of victim's death on victim's family).
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With doctrines regulating capital punishment in retreat or des-
uetude almost everywhere one turns in the eighth amendment area,
one capital punishment doctrine nonetheless hasstood firm. This
doctrine originates in the landmark 1976 ruling in Woodson v. North
Carolina,4 but is more familiarly associated with Lockett v. Ohio,5
which explicated Woodson's principles two years later. Lockett and its
progeny address a core requirement of capital sentencing procedure
by holding that a capital sentencing scheme must provide for an "in-
dividualized assessment of the appropriateness of the death pen-
alty."' 6 This individualized assessment is achieved only by allowing
the sentencer "to consider and give effect to any mitigating evidence
relevant to a defendant's background, character, or the circum-
stances of the crime."'7 Although the sovereigns in our federal sys-
tem who choose to employ the ultimate criminal sanction retain
considerable latitude regarding the shape and complexion of their
capital sentencing regimes, "the Eighth Amendment ... requires
consideration of the character and record of the individual offender
and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally
indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death.""
The Lockett doctrine has demonstrated impressive staying
power in the Supreme Court. In each of the Court's past six Terms,
at least one condemned inmate has secured relief fora violation of
one of the doctrine's constituent precepts. 9 The Court held fast to
the Lockett doctrine in these cases despite the virtually certain knowl-
4 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
5 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
6 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989).
7 Id. at 327 (finding requirement of individualized sentencing violated where sen-
tencingjury was not provided a vehicle in its sentencing issues and instructions to con-
sider and give mitigating effect to evidence of defendant's mental 'illness by imposing or
recommending a life sentence). The capital sentencer cannot be impeded "from consid-
ering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less
than death." Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion) (emphasis
omitted and supplied). Several Supreme Court decisions recognize that the Constitu-
tion requires individualized sentencing in capital cases, and that individualized sentenc-
ing requires that the capital sentencer be permitted to consider and give effect to all
relevant mitigating evidence. See, e.g., Boyde v. California, 110 S. Ct. 1190, 1196 (1990)
(stating the requirement and finding it met where sentencing jury is allowed to consider
all relevant mitigating evidence); Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 110 S. Ct. 1078, 1083 (1990)
(same).
8 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (plurality opinion) (citation
omitted).
9 See Parker v. Dugger, 111 S. Ct. 731 (1991); McKoy v. North Carolina, 492 U.S.
302 (1990); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989); Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367




edge that the lower courts would have to overturn many other death
sentences as a consequence.' 0 In a time when solicitude for eighth
amendment claims in capital cases is not readily discernible - in-
deed, in a time when almost any public display of affection for a
criminal defendant's constitutional claims is deemed the height of
bad taste - the Supreme Court's continued allegiance to Lockett is
no mean testament to the doctrine's strength.
What is it about the Lockett doctrine that has allowed it to sur-
vive, and some might even say thrive, in a climate so inhospitable to
many other rules bestowing constitutional rights upon criminal of-
fenders? The doctrine endures, I believe, for two principal reasons.
First, it serves the most fundamentally humane of purposes. Execu-
tion, the harshest punishment acceptable to our society, is legiti-
mate only when it can be said with confidence that it is not only a
permissible legal response but also the morally appropriate response to the
particular crime and the particular offender. The Lockett doctrine is
the primary legal tool for ensuring that each decision to employ the
death penalty is well grounded in morality. The doctrine achieves
this goal by setting out a series of requirements designed to guaran-
tee that the capital sentencer will be able and willing to make a relia-
ble moral decision.
The fact that it contributes to a sound constitutional objective is
not all that commends the Lockett doctrine. The second principal
reason why Lockett endures is that it performs its constitutional mis-
sion with admirable precision. Its requirements are carefully drawn
for maximum clarity and maximum ease in application by trial and
reviewing courts alike. This clarity minimizes frictions between fed-
eral and state authorities and limits intrusions upon state interests
by the federal judiciary. The Lockett doctrine brings the Constitu-
tion's grand principles to life in real cases while providing judges
and juries with predictable, workable and efficient rules.
This article's examination of the Lockett doctrine proceeds in
five stages. The constitutional principles that underlie the doctrine
are identified and elaborated in Part Two. Three central proposi-
tions emerge in that discussion: first, that it has made sense for the
Supreme Court to interpret the eighth amendment to forbid the im-
position of a morally inappropriate death sentence; second, that it
has made sense for the Court to hold that any system of capital pun-
ishment is unconstitutional unless the sentencing authority is able
10 In McKoy v. North Carolina, 110 S. Ct. 1227 (1990), Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S.
302 (1989), Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988), and Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S.
393 (1987), the Lockett violations were systemic, and thus are likely to have occurred in
many cases within the jurisdictions in question.
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and willing under that system to make a reliable determination of
the morally appropriate sentence in a given case; and third, that it
has made sense for the justices to conclude that discretion in the
hands of the sentencer is an indispensable feature of any valid capi-
tal sentencing scheme.
In Part Three, the requirement that a capital sentencer be
vested with discretion is reconciled with the principle that capital
punishment also must be subject to the rule of law. The eighth
amendment requires rationality and orderliness in capital sentenc-
ing. This requirement, however, does not contradict, qualify, or im-
pinge upon the amendment's coequal demand that a capital
sentencing system remain discretionary enough to ensure a reliable
determination of the death penalty's moral appropriateness in every
case.
After establishing the Lockett doctrine's constitutional basis, the
article's analysis turns to the doctrine's structure. While the jour-
nals include insightful treatments of the doctrine when it was nas-
cent,"1 a steady stream of Supreme Court capital litigation has run
its course since that time. The Lockett doctrine is now fit for evalua-
tion as a mature body of law. In Part Four, that evaluation begins
with a critical examination of the doctrine's various provisions. Par-
ticular attention is directed to how the doctrine successfully serves
eighth amendment principles while fairly and thoughtfully accom-
modating federalism concerns. The analysis of the Lockett doctrine
continues in Part Five, where special focus is devoted to the doc-
trine's operation and its function as a rule of structural and systemic
value to the legal system. Through the Lockett doctrine, reviewing
courts can distance themselves from the hard substantive moral
choices that must be made in any death penalty case by leaving
those choices to the sentencer. The doctrine's requirements estab-
lish the minimum conditions which must be met before the sen-
tencer can confidently be entrusted with those moral choices. A
logical consequence of this proposition is that any Lockett violation
requires reversal of a death sentence and a new sentencing determi-
nation by a qualified and reliable sentencer.
Lockett's central role in the Supreme Court's eighth amendment
11 See, e.g., Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 22-38, 60 (1980); Hertz &
Weisberg, In Mitigation of the Penalty of Death: Lockett v. Ohio and the Capital Defendant's
Right to Consideration of Mitigating Circumstances, 69 CALiF. L. REv. 317 (1981); Kaplan,
Evidence in Capital Cases, 11 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 369 (1983); Ledewitz, The Requirement of
Death: Mandatory Language in the Pennsylvania Death Penalty Statute, 21 DuQ.. L. REv. 103
(1982); Liebman & Shepard, Guiding Capital Sentencing Discretion Beyond the "Boiler Plate'"




capital punishment jurisprudence and its endurance in trying times
are not the only reasons it is worthy of examination at this time.
While few important constitutional doctrines escape criticism alto-
gether, Lockett recently has received a particularly scathing attack
from Justice Scalia. In Walton v. Arizona, decided at the end of the
1989 Term, Justice Scalia broke from the rest of the Court to disa-
vow the Lockett doctrine and the constitutional principles upon
which it is based and to call for Lockett's overruling. 12 Of course, it
remains to be seen whether Justice Scalia's challenge to Lockett and
its progeny will have any effect on the Court's eighth amendment
jurisprudence. But the conclusion reached in the sixth and final
part of this article is that Justice Scalia's attack on the Lockett doc-
trine is more revealing of the justice's individual jurisprudential
bent than it is of any particular flaw in the Lockett doctrine or its
constitutional foundation.
The Lockett doctrine has endured because it deserves to endure.
II. MORAL APPROPRIATENESS, RELIABLE DECISIONS, AND THE NEED
FOR DISCRETION IN CAPITAL SENTENCING
The fundamental constitutional propositions with which this ar-
ticle deals, and which will be developed in this section, can be stated
succinctly: The Constitution permits only morally appropriate impo-
sitions of the death penalty; it requires in every case that the capital
sentencer reliably determine that death is indeed the morally appro-
priate penalty; and it therefore requires that the capital sentencing
determination be discretionary.
Identifying and articulating the wide array of moral concerns
that should shape life's many choices - a sort of "moral calculus"
- and applying those concerns in diverse situations is a mind-bog-
gling task. It is especially confounding when the choice is as mo-
mentous as the choice between life and death. This difficulty no
doubt presents constitutional complexities, which will be taken up
soon enough. But for the moment, set aside the important question
of how moral appropriateness is determined and focus upon the
more basic proposition which must be established first: American
society should not execute a human being, in lieu of sentencing that
person to long-term or life imprisonment, unless it can be said con-
fidently that the death penalty is morally appropriate for the offense
and the offender at hand.
This proposition's constitutional credentials are not dependent




upon a belief that the proposition makes good philosophy or good
policy. People conceivably might differ with such a belief, as well as
with the suggestion that good philosophy or good policy necessarily
makes good constitutional principle. Rather, the Supreme Court
has found this proposition to be of constitutional dimension for a
much less controvertible reason. As the Court has concluded, the
proposition is an accurate statement of a long- and deeply-held be-
lief which American society has manifested through its choices re-
garding the administration of the death penalty.
Consider - as the Supreme Court did in McGautha v. Califor-
nia l3 and Woodson v. North Carolina 14 - why it is that by the mid-
20th century every state wishing to employ the death penalty had
turned away from the traditional mandatory death penalty for first
degree murder (or its locally defined equivalent) and instead had
given its juries ungoverned and unreviewable discretion either to im-
pose the death penalty or to dispense mercy.' 5 The states did not
turn en masse to discretionary capital sentencing schemes for aes-
thetic reasons. And only a cynic would think that all of the states left
the life or death decision to a sentencer's complete discretion so
that racial, cultural and economic prejudices might have more room
to maneuver 16 - although that surely proved to be a most regretta-
ble side-effect.
17
13 402 U.S. 183 (1971). In McGautha, the Court held that due process principles are
not offended when a jury is given complete and unreviewable discretion, unguided by
prescribed standards of any kind, to sentence a murderer to death or life imprisonment.
For further discussion of McGautha, see infra note 156.
14 428 U.S. 280 (1976). In Woodson, the Court declared unconstitutional a mandatory
death sentence for first degree murder. A plurality consisting of'Justices Stewart, Powell
and Stevens concluded that the eighth amendment requires individualized consideration
of the character and record of the offender and the circumstances of the particular of-
fense "as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of
death." Id. at 304 (plurality opinion). Justices Brennan and Marshall, believing the
death penalty to be in all instances cruel and unusual punishment, filed separate opin-
ions concurring in thejudgment. Id at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment); id. at
306 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment).
15 The movement to jury discretion in capital sentencing began in 1838, when Ten-
nessee abandoned its mandatory death penalty. By 1900, the federal government and
22 other states had followed Tennessee's lead, and by 1963 mandatory death sentences
had been rejected in favor of generalized discretionary sentencing in every state that
authorized capital punishment. Some statutes calling for mandatory death sentences for
particularly esoteric crimes, such as treason against state government, perjury in a capi-
tal case, and murder committed by an inmate serving a life sentence, managed to remain
on the books, but they almost never were enforced. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 291-92 n.25
(plurality opinion); McGautha, 402 U.S. at 199-202.
16 There is, however, evidence suggesting that some of the southern states may well
have adopted discretionary capital sentencing in part to further discriminatory objec-
tives. See H. BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 11 (3d ed. 1982).
17 See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 249-57 (1972) (Douglas,J, concurring);
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Legislatures gave their sentencers broad discretion, the Court
fairly inferred, because of the nation's growing understanding about
the enormity and complexity of capital sentencing. The "funda-
mental weakness" of traditional mandatory death penalty schemes
was their inability to reliably determine that death was the morally
appropriate sentence.18 Of course, these mandatory schemes did
not completely disregard moral concerns; anyone passingly ac-
quainted with the traditions of the criminal law would agree that the
elements of the capital offense and the defenses available to it were
designed to give expression to at least some moral concerns regard-
ing punishment. But all mandatory schemes by their nature circum-
scribe the range of moral considerations that are taken into account
in an individual case to those which happen to be reflected in the
substantive criminal law's doctrinal provisions. In addition to limit-
ing the range of relevant moral considerations, mandatory schemes
also limit the manner by which those considerations can be applied
in a case. Moral considerations can be dealt with only indirectly -
to the extent that they are otherwise manifested through the doctri-
nal forms of the substantive criminal law. In short, a mandatory
death penalty scheme subordinates moral considerations to legal
form. Whenever such subordination occurs the moral correctness
of any rendered decision is jeopardized.
The risk that a morally inappropriate death penalty might be
imposed under a mandatory scheme was not just an abstract short-
coming, bothersome only to theoreticians. Jurors, people from all
walks of life, voiced their objections. When the law demanded the
imposition of the death sentence in a particular case despite moral
considerations arguing against it, juries were quick to nullify the law
and go instead with morality. They acquitted defendants in convinc-
ing first degree murder cases rather than lend their hands to the
imposition of death sentences that were, in their judgment, morally
inappropriate. Thesejurors were notflagburning subversives intent
on defying the law. If we could ask them today to explain their ac-
tions, they likely would answer with something along the following
lines: "We believe strongly in capital punishment, we believe
strongly in obeying the law, and we also believe strongly in obeying
the law even when we are convinced that it reaches morally inappro-
priate results. Except here. Not when life or death is literally the is-
id. at 362-66 (Marshall,J., concurring). Concerns about the discriminatory use of discre-
tion in capital sentencing persist today. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 320-
45 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 35-36 (1986).
18 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 291 (plurality opinion).
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sue. Death is different." 19 With real defendants and real lives at
stake, American sentencers refused to subordinate morality to legal
form.
Significantly, the legislatures did not respond to the widespread
phenomenon ofjury nullification by elaborating upon the elements
of capital murder or the defenses to it. Doing so might have made
the law responsive to a broader range of moral concerns, but it
would have been at best a partial solution to the problem. More law
could never have fully solved the problem revealed by jury nullifica-
tion because legal form, with its inherent limitations, was very much
part of the problem. Hard as they may try, human beings are funda-
mentally unable fully to express morality through the forms of law.
Just as an expression loses meaning when translated to another lan-
guage, moral considerations cannot survive intact the conversion
into legal form.
Equally significantly, the legislatures did not address jury nulli-
fication by replacing mandatory capital sentencing schemes with
checklists of moral considerations which juries or judges would be
expected to employ in the course of rendering discretionary sen-
tencing decisions. This approach also would have proved unavail-
ing because of humankind's inability to articulate in advance a moral
calculus which can satisfactorily determine which murderers should
die and which should be spared. There is simply no objective, ar-
ticulable, and complete catalogue of the morally appropriate and
the morally inappropriate in capital sentencing. The second Justice
Harlan summed up the teachings to be gleaned from the shift from
mandatory to discretionary capital sentencing in a now-familiar pas-
sage from McGautha v. Califo, ia:,
Those who have come to grips with the hard task of actually attempt-
ing to draft means of channeling capital sentencing discretion have
confirmed the lesson taught'by ... history .... To identify before the
fact those characteristics of criminal homicides and their perpetrators
which call for the death penalty, and to express these characteristics in
language which can be fairly understood and applied by the sentenc-
ing authority, appear to be tasks which are beyond present human
ability.20
19 Jury nullification of the mandatory death penalty laws is documented and dis-
cussed in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 290-91 (1976) (plurality opinion),
and McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 199 (1971). See also BEDAU, supra note 16, at
27-28.
20 402 U.S. at 204 (1971). "[A] judge or jury's decision to kill is an intensely moral,
subjective matter that seems to defy the designers of general formulas for legal deci-
sion." Weisberg, supra note 1, at 308. See also Roberts (Stanislaus) v. Louisiana, 428
U.S. 325, 332-33 (1976) (plurality opinion).
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The failure of mandatory capital sentencing schemes does not
mean that it is impossible to determine reliably the moral appropri-
ateness of a death sentence. It does indicate, however, that whoever
is charged with making the determination must be free to engage in
an open and flexible moral inquiry that attends to the nuances that
can distinguish seemingly similar cases. Legislators across the na-
tion heeded this proposition when they overwhelmingly adopted
discretionary capital sentencing schemes that gave the sentencer
freedom to respond to an unlimited and unspecified array of moral
considerations. "The ... subjective juror responses which resulted
in juror nullification under the old system were legitimized. '" 2 1
In light of the above history, it is not difficult to see why the
imposition of a morally inappropriate death sentence is unconstitu-
tional even under a narrow construction of the eighth amendment.
With the possible exception ofJustice Souter, who has yet to vote in
a case directly presenting the question, no one on the Court today
disputes that the eighth amendment's cruel and unusual pun-
ishments clause derives at least some of its content from the "evolv-
ing standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society." 22 The justices also appear to agree that legislative enact-
ments and jury verdicts are objective indicators of those evolving
standards. 23 As the Court recognized in Woodson v. North Carolina,24
21 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 312 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See supra note 15.
22 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 368-69 (1989) (plurality opinion) (quoting
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion)); id. at 381-82 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment); id. at 382 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
23 See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 371, 374 (plurality opinion); id. at 380 (O'ConnorJ, con-
curring in part and concurring in judgment); id. at 381 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The current members of the Court disagree, however, regarding whether, and to
what extent, the eighth amendment gives the justices a mission over and above enforc-
ing the amendment's original intent and society's subsequently evolved standards of
decency. For many years, various members of the Court have believed that "[tihe basic
concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man,"
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion), and that the amendment's
fundamental respect for human dignity imposes both substantive and procedural limita-
tions on the state's power to punish. These justices submit that it is thejudiciary's duty
to articulate and enforce these limitations as vigorously as it enforces other standards of
decency embraced by the amendment. This view was held by a majority of the Court
upon the retirement of Justice Brennan. See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 390-92 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting, joined by Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens, JJ.); id. at 380-82 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 335-
36 (1989) (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.); id. at 343-34 (Brennan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part, joined by Marshall, J.); id. at 349-50 (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part, joined by Blackmun, J.); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487
U.S. 815, 833 (1988) (plurality opinion of Stevens, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall and
Blackmun, JJ.); id. at 853 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment); Sumner v. Shuman,
483 U.S. 66, 85 (1987) (opinion of the Court per Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan, Mar-
shall, Powell, Stevens, and O'Connor, JJ.); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982)
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in which it first struck down a mandatory capital punishment statute,
the legislative shift from mandatory to discretionary capital sentenc-
ing schemes reveals society's firm belief that morally inappropriate
death sentences are indecent and fundamentally illegitimate. It
does an injustice to both the American public and the eighth amend-
ment to interpret society's documented aversion to mandatory
death sentences as a meager objection to excessive formality in the
imposition of capital punishment. It is more realistic to interpret
the legislative shift, as the Woodson plurality did, as an expression of
a deeper, substantive societal value: Where the death penalty is con-
cerned, "[t]he belief no longer prevails that every offense in a like
legal category calls for an identical punishment without regard to
the past life and habits of a particular offender."' 25 The belief no
longer prevails because adherence to it produces morally unaccept-
able consequences - death sentences that are "unduly harsh" 26 be-
cause they fail to appreciate that "individual culpability is not always
measured by the category of the crime committed." 27 Thus, the no-
tion that the moral appropriateness of a capital sentence must be
reliably determined was "not drawn from a hat" by the Court.28 It is
(opinion of the Court per White, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Ste-
vens, JJ.). See also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978) (plurality opinion of
Burger C.J.,joined by Stewart, Powell, and Stevens,JJ.); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,
597 (1977) (plurality opinion of White, J.,joined by Stewart, Blackmun and Stevens,JJ.);
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304-05 (1976) (plurality opinion of Stewart,
Powell, and Stevens,JJ.); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (plurality opinion
of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.); Liebman & Shepard, supra note 11, at 766-77.
Four members of the Court apparently have retreated from this position, at least
insofar as it authorizes the Court. to review the substantive wisdom of a legislatively
authorized sentence for a class of offender or offense. See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 377-78
(plurality opinion of Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White and Kennedy, JJ.);
Penry, 492 U.S. at 351 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by
Rehnquist, CJ., and White and Kennedy, JJ.); Thompson, 487 U.S. at 873 (Scalia, J., dis-
senting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J. and White, J.). See also Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct.
3047, 3066-67 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
24 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
25 Id. at 296-97 (plurality opinion) (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247
(1949)).
26 Id at 293 (plurality opinion).
27 Id. at 298 (plurality opinion) (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 402
(1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)). See also Roberts (Stanislaus) v. Louisiana, 428 U.S.
325, 333 (1976) (plurality opinion) ("the 19th century movement away from mandatory
death sentences was rooted in [this] recognition").
A majority of the justices recently voiced the same reading of history, observing that
society has "long held [the belief] that defendants who commit criminal acts that are
attributable to a disadvantaged background, or to emotional and mental problems, may
be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse." Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S.
302, 319 (1989) (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)).
28 Woodson's "prohibition of automatic death sentences for certain crimes [was] not
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one of society's evolved standards of decency, and is therefore em-
braced by the eighth amendment.2 9
The foregoing also explains why the Court has concluded that
"discretion in a capital punishment system is necessary to satisfy the
Constitution." 30 The goal of imposing only morally appropriate
death sentences is impossible to meet unless and until someone
gives the concept of moral appropriateness substantive content. As
Woodson acknowledged, society's rejection of mandatory death pen-
alty statutes manifests an unwillingness to entrust the legislatures
with the task of formulating a definitive and close-ended moral
calculus for choosing between life and death.3' Capital sentencing
schemes that legislatively pre-set this moral calculus, or that
subordinate moral considerations to legal form, do not reliably mea-
sure the moral appropriateness of any particular death sentence.
The range of moral considerations that reasonable, civilized people
might find relevant to the appropriateness of a particular death sen-
tence is inestimably broad and impossible to articulate completely in
advance.3 2 The risk that a legislatively pre-set moral calculus will
produce a death sentence of questionable moral appropriateness is
one that society declared itself unwilling to tolerate when it moved
to discretionary capital sentencing schemes. Evolved standards of
decency demand that the capital sentencer have the discretion to
attend and respond to any considerations that might make the death
penalty morally inappropriate in a particular case.33 Only then can
society have confidence in the decision that death is the morally ap-
propriate punishment. 34
drawn from a hat, but [was] thought to be (once again) what a national consensus re-
quired." Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 875 (1988) (ScaliaJ., dissenting) (cita-
tion omitted).
29 The eighth amendment embraces "the principle that punishment should be di-
rectly related to the personal culpability of the criminal defendant." Penry v. Lynaugh,
492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989).
30 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 314 n.37 (1987).
31 American society's rejection of mandatory death penalty legislation reflected the
recognition of "[tihe inadequacy of distinguishing between murderers solely on the ba-
sis of legislative criteria." Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 291 (1976) (plural-
ity opinion).
32 Any effort to fully articulate the many moral considerations that might be relevant
to the question of punishment or to specify which ones alone ought to mitigate in favor
of a life sentence "would [be to] assume some objective criterion of what is mitigating,
which is precisely what [the Constitution] forbid[s]." Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct.
3047, 3062 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
33 "[F]lexibility remedied the harshness of mandatory statutes by permitting the jury
to respond to mitigating factors by withholding the death penalty." Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 291 (1976) (plurality opinion).
34 The fact that a number of the states were willing to enact mandatory death penalty
statutes following Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), which invalidated all death
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The plurality opinion in Woodson did not rely exclusively on an
analysis of evolved standards of decency in condemning the
mandatory death penalty for murder. The plurality also believed
that "the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment
requires consideration of the character and record of the individual
offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a consti-
tutionally indispensable.part of the process of inflicting the penalty
of death." 35 A majority of the Court has affirmed this proposition
squarely and repeatedly since Woodson.36 There is, however, no
need to rely upon the eighth amendment's respect for human dig-
nity to conclude that the Constitution requires discretion in capital
sentencing so that the moral appropriateness of the penalty can be
reliably determined. Evolved standards of decency, properly under-
stood, dictate the same result.
III. THE RULE OF LAW AND FURMAN V. GEORGIA
Although discretion in capital sentencing is constitutionally re-
quired, it does not follow that legal form must be avoided whenever
the death penalty is at issue. Society long has favored adherence to
the rule of law in order to legitimize the exercise of governmental
power. Undeniably, killing criminal offenders is among the rawest
and most provocative uses of governmental power known to this or
any other nation. Capital punishment probably will remain inaltera-
bly illegitimate to a significant segment of the American public. But
even supporters of the death penalty concede that capital punish-
ment must be administered in a fundamentally legitimate manner -
that is, fairly, even-handedly and with thought and care.
penalty schemes that granted sentencers unbridled discretion, does not alter this conclu-
sion. Not every legislative enactment represents a thoughtful and considered expres-
sion of contemporary social ideals, particularly legislation which appears to dramatically
reestimate a fundamental standard of decency. See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487
U.S. 815, 857 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment). Legislation is particularly
likely to be unrepresentative of contemporary social ideals when legislators believe that
they must take action, yet perceive that the Supreme Court has left them with sharply
limited and uncertain options. Legislation passed in such a climate frequently is so laced
with assumptions about what the justices believe and will permit that it is weak and
unreliable evidence of society's own standards. The post-Furman reenactment of
mandatory death penalty schemes is a classic illustration of this phenomenon. See
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 298-300 & n.35 (1976) (plurality opinion).
See also the discussion of Furman in Part Three of this article.
35 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976), (plurality opinion) (citation
omitted) (emphasis supplied).
36 E.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989); Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66,
85 (1987); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110-12 (1982). See also McCleskey v.




By that measure, the death penalty's legitimacy was in grave
doubt when the nation began to examine capital punishment closely
in the 1960s. As well-intentioned as the unbridled discretion
schemes seem to have been, their results were deeply disturbing. At
best, the pattern of sentencing decisions (if a set of capricious re-
sults can be called a "pattern") lacked rhyme or reason to explain it.
At worst, the results could be considered powerful evidence of in-
vidious discrimination.3 7 Capital punishment was an ailing institu-
tion and the nation imposed a moratorium on executions in the late
1960s to study the matter more thoroughly.38 To some prognosti-
cators, the patient was terminally ill and the only humane alternative
was to put it out of its misery swiftly and painlessly.39 But a majority
of the justices believed that the Court lacked the constitutional
wherewithal to abolish capital punishment - a position which may
have been reached by the Court privately as early as in 1967,40 was
37 See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 249-57 (1972) (DouglasJ., concurring);
id. at 362-66 (Marshall, J., concurring).
38 The racially discriminatory effects of capital punishment as applied in the United
States provoked the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., to lead a sus-
tained nationwide series of legal challenges. See M. MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL:
THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1973); Note, The Legal Defense Fund's
Capital Punishment Campaign: The Distorting Influence of Death, 4 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 158
(1985). By 1967, executions had ceased while the constitutional claims were adjudi-
cated. MELTSNER, supra, at 183.
Undoubtedly, the tenor of the times helped the death row lawyers. Public support
for the death penalty had declined steadily into the mid-1960s. See, e.g., Erskine, The
Polls: Capital Punishment, 34 PUB. OPINION Q. 290 (1970). Furthermore, inside the
Supreme Court, at least one justice was working to place capital punishment on the
Court's agenda. In 1963, Justice Arthur Goldberg circulated a lengthy memorandum
discussing capital punishment's constitutional status and proposing that the Court take
up the issue in one or more of six capital cases for which certiorari petitions were pend-
ing. Brennan, Constitutional Adjudication and the Death Penalty: A View from the Court, 100
HARv. L. REV. 313, 314-15 (1986); Goldberg, Death and the Supreme Court, 15 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 1, 1-3 (1987); Goldberg, Memorandum to the Conference Re: Capital Punishment,
27 S. TEX. L. REV. 493 (1986) (reproducing Goldberg memorandum verbatim). When
Justice Goldberg's memorandum failed to convince the Court to take any of the pending
cases, he drafted a dissent from the denial of certiorari in one of the cases, Rudolph v.
Alabama, 375 U.S. 889 (1963) (Goldberg, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari),
that was joined by Justices Douglas and Brennan. The viability of the capital punish-
ment issue thus was flagged for the public generally, and for the constitutional bar and
lower courts in particular.
39 See, e.g., Bedau, The Courts, the Constitution, and Capital Punishment, 1968 UTAH L.
REV. 201; Black, The Crisis in Capital Punishment, 31 MD. L. REV. 289 (1971); Goldberg &
Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1773 (1970).
40 In Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), the Court granted certiorari to con-
sider directly for the first time the death penalty's per se constitutionality. The case was
resolved on grounds unrelated to that eighth amendment question, but one source sug-
gests that the justices voted privately on the question in the course of conferencing and
marked their conclusion in favor of constitutionality. See B. WOODWARD & S. ARM-
STRONG, THE BRETHREN 206-07 (1979).
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strongly forecasted publicly by 1971,41 and was explicitly an-
nounced in Gregg v. Georgia in 1976.42
Pnstead of abolishing capital punishment, the Court chose to
regulate it, taking perhaps not the first step43 but certainly the first
true leap of faith in its landmark 1972 decision of Furman v. Geor-
41 See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971). To Justice Brennan at least, Mc-
Gautha signalled "the end of any hope that the Court would hold capital punishment to
be unconstitutional." Brennan, supra note 38, at 321.
42 428 U.S. 153 (1976). In Gregg, Justices Stewart, Powell and Stevens joined in a
plurality opinion which reasoned that capital punishment would constitute cruel and
unusual punishment if it were substantially out of step with "the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society," id. at 173 (quoting Trop v. Dul-
les, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion)), or if it failed to accord with "the dignity
of man" underlying the eighth amendment by inflicting unnecessary and wanton pain or
by being grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime, id. at 173. In the plural-
ity's judgment, capital punishment withstands challenge under both tests because it
neither offends contemporary societal standards of decency, id at 182, nor is unjustifi-
ably or unconstitutionally severe, id- at 186-87.
Justice White, joined by ChiefJustice Burger and then-Justice Rehnquist, concurred
in the judgment based on the views expressed injustice White's dissenting opinion filed
the same day in Roberts (Stanislaus) v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 350-56 (1976). These
justices adopted substantially the same eighth amendment analysis as the plurality in
concluding that the death penalty is not per se unconstitutional. The decisions of Con-
gress and 35 states to reenact the death penalty after Furman, they reasoned, precluded a
finding that capital punishment "is offensive to the prevailing attitudes and moral
presuppositions in the United States." Id. at 353. Nor could these justices find fault
with the judgments of these same legislatures that the death penalty appropriately serves
legitimate punishment goals. Id. at 354-55.
Justice Blackmun also concurred in the Greggjudgment, filing a one-sentence opin-
ion in which he cited his own dissent four years earlier in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238, 405-14 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting), as well as the dissenting opinions in that
same case of ChiefJustice Burger, id. at 375 (Burger, C.J., dissenting), and then-Justice
Rehnquist, id. at 465 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 428 U.S. at 227 (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring in judgment). Although he found the death penalty personally distressing, Justice
Blackmun was unprepared to hold the death penalty unconstitutional in light of consid-
erable legislative support for its use. Furman, 408 U.S. at 405-13 (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing).
Only Justices Brennan and Marshall adopted the position in Gregg that the death
penalty is per se unconstitutional. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 227 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at
231 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In so concluding, each reiterated the views he had es-
poused earlier in Furman. See 408 U.S. at 257 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 314 (Mar-
shall, J., concurring). Injustice Brennan's view, the death penalty fails under the eighth
amendment because it denies human dignity; it constitutes the arbitrary imposition of an
unusually severe punishment which society does not consider acceptable and which
serves no penal purpose more effectively than significantly less drastic punishments.
Furman, 408 U.S. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring). ForJustice Marshall, the death pen-
alty is unconstitutional because it is excessive in relation to the purposes that might be
asserted to justify it, and is morally unacceptable to a citizenry informed about its actual
application and consequences. Id. at 342-59, 360-69 (Marshall, J., concurring).
43 See, e.g., Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968) (holding unconstitutional a
death sentence imposed by ajury from which all prospective jurors who had expressed
conscientious scruples against capital punishment had been excused for cause without
any attempt to determine whether they could nevertheless return a verdict of death).
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gia.4 4 In a famously fractured decision - each of the ninejustices
wrote separately - the Court invalidated capital punishment stat-
utes which gave juries unbridled sentencing discretion as violative
of the eighth amendment ban against cruel and unusual punish-
ments. As the Court later explained, Furman found unbridled sen-
tencing discretion unconstitutional because it "created a substantial
risk that [the death sentence] would be inflicted in an arbitrary and
capricious manner. '45 To comply with the eighth amendment, a
state is required to bring capital punishment closer to the rule of law
by making it more rational and more orderly; "if a State wishes to
authorize capital punishment it has a constitutional responsibility to
tailor and apply its law in a manner that avoids the arbitrary and
capricious infliction of the death penalty."
46
Occasionally, it is argued that Furman's call for rational orderli-
ness impinges upon or otherwise qualifies the constitutional impera-
tive of discretion in capital sentencing recognized in Woodson,
Lockett, and their progeny. 47 If Furman does threaten the principle of
Woodson and Lockett, then it is dead wrong as a matter of constitu-
tional law. As noted above, the discretion which allows a capital
sentencer to reach a morally appropriate determination is inextrica-
bly bound up in and mandated by society's evolved standards of de-
cency. Society alone can cause those evolved standards of decency
to change.48 No matter how broad the Supreme Court's latitude
under the Constitution might be, the justices have no license to
compromise society's standards of decency to incur even the slight-
44 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
45 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (plurality opinion).
46 Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980) (plurality opinion).
47 See, e.g., Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047, 3067-68 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and concurring in judgment). There has even been an intimation in at least one
Supreme Court majority opinion to this effect. See Boyde v. California, 110 S. Ct. 1190,
1196 (1990) ("States are free to structure and shape consideration of mitigating evi-
dence 'in an effort to achieve a more rational and equitable administration of the death
penalty.' ") (citation omitted).
48 See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 (1989) ("In determining what
standards have 'evolved,' however, we have looked not to our own conceptions of de-
cency, but to those of modern American society as a whole"); Thompson v. Oklahoma,
487 U.S. 815, 865 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Of course the risk of assessing evolv-
ing standards is that it is all too easy to believe that evolution has culminated in one's
own views. To avoid this danger we have.., looked for objective signs of how today's
society views a particular punishment") (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 277-79
(1972)(Brennan, J. concurring)). For present purposes, it may be assumed that the
eighth amendment's recognition that standards of decency evolve connotes no substan-
tive value judgments about what it means to "evolve." Under this assumption, even a
reversion to earlier understandings might qualify as an evolution in contemporary con-
ceptions of decency - although there are difficulties associated with assessing the signif-
icance of an abrupt change in course. See supra note 34.
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est concession of morality to the rule of law. Even if the eighth
amendment did give the justices permission to impose new stan-
dards of decency upon society, rather than confining the Court to
the less subjective task of discerning society's already-evolved stan-
dards of decency (a proposition with which some of the justices
doubtless would disagree), Furman nevertheless would not threaten
the principle of Woodson and Lockett. No currently accepted norm of
constitutional adjudication could legitimize a ruling that would re-
quire society to tolerate morally questionable death sentences, de-
spite any potential gains in systemic rationality or orderliness.
Indeed, it is not clear that a legal system that produced morally in-
appropriate death sentences could ever be called rational or
orderly. 4
9
If Furman cannot alter the constitutional impermissibility of
risking a morally erroneous death sentence by subordinating moral-
ity to law, what then is Furman's effect on death penalty jurispru-
dence? There are basically two schools of thought on this point.
One view sees in Furman a mandate that arbitrariness, capricious-
ness and irrationality be rooted out of capital sentencing patterns
almost entirely. If this mandate cannot be achieved while maintain-
ing the discretion necessary to guard against morally inappropriate
sentences, then capital punishment simply cannot be administered
at all.50 The other view, which apparently commands a majority of
the justices, does not allow Furman to imperil capital punishment's
very existence. For the majority ofjustices, defacto or dejure judicial
abolition of the death penalty is constitutionally unsupportable, and
Furman therefore must be interpreted to demand at most the practi-
cally attainable. 51 Neither interpretation of Furman, however, ren-
49 Since Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982), the Court has recognized
that "a consistency [in capital sentencing] produced by ignoring individual differences is
a false consistency." See also Boyde v. California, 110 S. Ct. 1190, 1201 (1990) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting) ("The insistence in our law that the sentencer know and consider
the defendant as a human being before deciding whether to impose the ultimate sanc-
tion operates as a shield against arbitrary execution"); McKoy v: North Carolina, 110 S.
Ct. 1127 (1990) (jury discretion to consider moral appropriateness of death sentence
unduly limited, posing unacceptable risk of arbitrary death sentences); Mills v. Mary-
land, 486 U.S. 367 (1988) (same).
50 See, e.g., Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047, 3069 n.1 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) ("Our cases have applied these principles [that capital punishment not be meted
out arbitrarily or irrationally, and that the punishment must also accord with human
dignity] together to 'insis[t] that capital punishment be imposed fairly, and with reason-
able consistency, or not at all.' ") (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112
(1982)) (emphasis supplied in Walton).
51 Whatever rational orderliness Furman might demand from capital punishment, it
"does not 'plac[e] totally unrealistic conditions on its use.'" McCleskey v. Kemp, 481
U.S. 279, 315 n.37 (1987) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 n.50 (1976)
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ders it logically irreconcilable with Woodson and Lockett. Woodson and
Lockett mandate that a sentencer be given a limited discretion that is
not arbitrary, capricious or standardless - the discretion to give a life
sentence because of moral considerations that arise directly from the mitigating
circumstances of the offense and the offender.
IV. MAKING MORAL APPROPRIATENESS POSSIBLE: THE DOCTRINE
OF LOCKETT v. OHIO AND ITS PROGENY
Having identified some of the principles that have emerged as
fundamental under the eighth amendment - that only morally ap-
propriate death penalties are permissible, that a reliable determina-
tion must be made that death is indeed the morally appropriate
decision in a given case, and that a capital sentencing procedure ac-
cordingly must be sufficiently discretionary to make reliable deter-
minations possible - we are ready to confont much the same
question that the Court faced after its 1976 Woodson ruling. How
may the Court assure adherence to these constitutional principles
while minimizing needless frictions and keeping true to the judicial
craft? The Court's answer to this question may constitute the single
most important doctrine governing capital punishment today - the
doctrine equated with Lockett v. Ohio 52 and its progeny.
Generally speaking, Lockett and the cases following it hold that a
capital sentencing scheme must provide for an "individualized
asssessment of the appropriateness of the death penalty,"53 an as-
sessment which cannot be made if the sentencer is impeded "from
considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's charac-
ter or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the
defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death."
'54
(plurality opinion)). The McCleskey decision fairly can be read to have turned on this
precise point. Condemned to die in Georgia, Warren McCleskey contended - with
impressive supporting data - that the state's capital sentencing scheme was arbitrary
and capricious in its application because its results ultimately were explicable only as the
products of impermissible racial considerations. According tojustice Powell, the author
of the majority opinion rejecting McCleskey's challenge, Georgia could make its scheme
more rational only at the expense of either discretion (which cannot be compromised)
or the system's basic workability. In the final analysis, then, McCleskey lost because his
"call for greater rationality [was] no less than a claim that a capital punishment system
cannot be administered in accord with the Constitution." 481 U.S. at 315 n.37.
52 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
53 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989). See also Boyde v. California, 110 S.
Ct. 1190, 1196 (1990) (same).
54 Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 (plurality opinion) (emphasis omitted and supplied). See
also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 314-15 n.37 (1987) ("We have held that discre-
tion in a capital punishment system is necessary to satisfy the Constitution .... [The
Constitution requires that juries be allowed to consider 'any relevant mitigating factor,'
even if it is not included in a statutory list .... If capital defendants are to be treated as
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When the sentencer is unable to give "independent mitigating
weight to aspects of the defendant's character and record and to
circumstances of the offense proffered in mitigation [there is a] risk
that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which may
call for a less severe penalty. When the choice is between life and
death, that risk is unacceptable and incompatible with the com-
mands of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. '55
It is worthwhile to explore the Lockett doctrine in some detail,
for Lockett and its progeny accomplish a great deal of constitutional
work with remarkable efficiency. By way of preface, first note the
simplicity of the doctrine's overall strategy: A class of evidence,
called "mitigating evidence," is defined, and a series of require-
ments is imposed concerning the treatment of that evidence in any
capital sentencing process. Those requirements guarantee that mit-
igating evidence will be considered in the capital sentencer's deci-
sion. When the Lockett doctrine's requirements are obeyed, the
capital sentencing process becomes open and flexible, thus enhanc-
ing the likelihood that the sentencer's moral decision will be
reliable.
A. THE DEFINITION OF MITIGATING EVIDENCE
Consider first Lockett's definition of "mitigating evidence," that
class of evidence entitled to particular consideration under the
eighth amendment. Mitigating evidence, the cases provide, is any
"fact[] about the defendant's character or background, or the cir-
cumstances of the particular offense, that may call for a penalty less
than death." 56 By several measures, the definition deserves high
marks. First, it contains no reference to any particular moral theory
or theories. This "moral neutrality" is a considerable achievement
'uniquely individual human beings,'.., then discretion to evaluate and weigh the cir-
cumstances relevant to the particular defendant and the crime he committed is essen-
tial.") (citations omitted).
55 Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605 (plurality opinion). Accord Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66,
82, 85 (1987) (mandatory death sentence for murder committed by life-term inmate
unconstitutional because it precludes consideration of mitigating evidence and therefore
creates risk that death sentence will be imposed in spite of factors which might call for a
less severe penalty; "[h]aving reached unanimity on the constitutional significance of
individualized sentencing in capital cases, we decline to depart from that mandate");
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 117 n.* (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("failure
to consider all mitigating evidence risks erroneous imposition of the death sentence").
56 Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 188 (1988) (O'Connor, J. concurring) (citing
California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 541 (1987)). See also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586
(1978) (plurality opinion) (mitigating evidence is "any aspect of a defendant's character
or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a
basis for a sentence less than death") (emphasis supplied).
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in light of the alternative. Were the justices to define mitigating evi-
dence with reference to some particular moral theory, they could be
accused of legislating their own morals, to the exclusion of other
reasonably held and equally legitimate moral precepts, under cover
of the eighth amendment. Nothing in the Constitution permits the
Court to give credence to only some of the moral considerations
which rational people might deem germane to the appropriateness
of the death penalty in a particular case. As Justice Scalia has stated
succinctly, the eighth amendment discloses no "objective criterion
of what is mitigating." 57 The Lockett doctrine avoids this subjective
quagmire. It defines mitigating evidence by reference to the facts of
the individual case and the possibility that, under some moral the-
ory, some of those facts could conceivably give rise to an argument
against imposition of the death penalty. If evidence bears on "any
aspect" of the defendant's character, record or crime, 58 and if it
could support a reasonable argument for a sentence less than
death, 59 then it is by definition mitigating evidence.
Second, Lockett's definition extends constitutional protection to
the kind of evidence that must be taken into account at sentencing
to produce a morally appropriate sentence. Any evidence about the
offender or the offense that might support a conceivable moral ar-
gument against the death sentence in a particular case is protected
under Lockett's definition. Mitigating evidence might include, for in-
stance, evidence that a death sentence would be unjust because the
defendant's personal responsibility for the offense is lessened by
youth,60 stunted intellectual and emotional growth, 61 mental retar-
57 Walton v. Arizona; 110 S. Ct. 3047, 3062 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment).
Justice Powell not long ago proposed that the Court limit the range of moral con-
siderations deserving of constitutional protection in the capital sentencing process to
"those factors that are central to the fundamental justice of execution." Skipper v.
South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 13 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in judgment). Such an
open-ended formulation cannot provide meaningful guidance until it is given more de-
finitive substantive content. That substantive content can be provided only through
highly subjective (and hence constitutionally suspect) value judgments. Who is to say,
for instance, what the fundamental justice of execution is and what matters are "central"
to it? By what criteria can such matters be determined?
58 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 n.12 (1978) (plurality opinion).
59 See McKoy v. North Carolina, 110 S. Ct. 1227, 1232 (1990) ("if the sentencer could
reasonably find that it warrants a sentence less than death"); Skipper v. South Carolina,
476 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1986) ("inferences would be 'mitigating' in the sense that they might
serve 'as a basis for a sentence less than death.' ") (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion)).
60 See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 375 (1989) (plurality opinion);
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 833-38 (1988); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S.
104, 116 (1982); ALA. CODE § 13A-5-51(7) (1975 & Supp. 1990); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-703G.5 (1982 & Supp. 1989); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-4-605(4) (1987); CAL. PENAL
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dation or impaired capacity,62 mental or emotional disturbance,63
provocation by others,64 insanity,65 the influence of alcohol or drugs
at the time of the offense, 66 or shared or limited participation in the
CODE § 190.3(i) (West 1988); COLO. REv. STAT. § 16-11-103(5)(a) (1986); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a(g)(1) (West 1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(6)(g) (West 1985);
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(c)(7) (West 1986 & Supp. 1990); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 905.5(f) (West 1981 & Supp. 1991); MD. CIM. LAW CODE § 413(g)(5) (1988); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 9 9-19-101(6)(g) (1972 & Supp. 1990); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.012.3(7)
(Vernon 1979); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-304(7) (1989); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-
2523(2)(d)'(1989); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5II(b)(5) (1986'& Supp. 1990); N.J. REV.
STAT. § 2C:I 1-3c(5)(c) (1982 & Supp. 1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-6.I (1978); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(f)(7) (1988); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B)(4) (Baldwin
1986); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(e)(4) (Pardon 1982); S.C. CODE §§ 16-3-20(C)(b)(7),
(9) (1985 & Supp. 1990); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207(2)(e) (1990); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 19.2-264.4.B(v) (1990); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.070(7) (1990); Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-
102(i)(vii) (1988 & Supp. 1990).
61 See, e.g., Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 789 n.7 (1987).
62 See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989); ALA. CODE §§ 13A-5-51(5),
(6) (1975 & Supp. 1990); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703G.1 (1982 & Supp. 1989); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 5-4-605(3) (1987); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(h) (West 1988); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 16-11-103(5)(b) (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a(g)(2) (West 1985);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(6)(f) (West 1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(c)(6) (West
1986 & Supp 1990); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 905.5(e) (West 1986 & Supp. 1991); MD.
CrIM. LAw CODE § 413(g)(4) (1988); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(6)(f) (1972 & Supp.
1990); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.032.3(6) (Vernon 1979); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-304(4)
(1989); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2523(2)(g) (1989); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5II(b)(4)
(1982 & Supp. 1990); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2C:1 1-3c(5)(d) (1982 & Supp. i990); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 31-20A-6.C (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(f)(6) (1988); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2929.04(B)(3) (Baldwin.1986); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §.9711(e)(3) (1982); S.C.
CODE § 16-3-20(C)(b)(6) (1985 & Supp. 1990); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207(2)(d)
(1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4.B(iv) (1990); WASH. REV, CODE § 10.95.070(6)
(1990); Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-102(i)(vi) (1988 & Supp. 1990).
63 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-5-51(2) (1975 & Supp. 1990); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-4-
605(1) (1987); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(d) (West 1988); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-
103(5)(f) (1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(6)(b) (West 1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
9-1(c)(2) (1979 & Supp. 1990); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(c)(2) (West 1986 & Supp.
1990); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 905.5(b) (West 1981 & Supp. 1991); MIsS. CODE ANN.
§ 99-19-101(6)(b) (1972 & Supp. 1990); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.032.3(2) (Vernon 1979);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-304(2) (1989); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2523(2)(c) (1989); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5II(b)(2) (1982 & Supp. 1990); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2C:11-3c(5)(a)
(1982 & Supp. 1990); N.M. STAT, ANN. § 31-20A-6.D (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-
2000(0(2) (1988); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 971 1(e)(2) (1982); S.C. CODE § 16-3-20(C)(b)(2)
(1985 & Supp. 1990); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207(2)(b) (1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-
264.4.B(ii) (1990); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.070(2) (1990); Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-102(i)(ii)
(1988 & Supp. 1990).
64 See, e.g., Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582, 621 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 976 (1979); MD. CRIM. LAw CODE § 413(g)(3) (1988); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2929.04(B)(2) (Baldwin 1986); S.C. CODE. ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(b)(8) (1985 & Supp.
1990).
65 See, e.g., Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 414 (1986).
66 See, e.g., Robison v. Maynard, ,829 F.2d 1501 (10th Cir. 1987); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-
4-605(3) (1987); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(h) (West 1988); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-
103(5)(i) (1986); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(c)(6) (West 1986 & Supp. 1990); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 905.5(e) (West 1981 & Supp. 1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 2 9 -2523(2)(g)
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actual crime.6 7 Lockett's definition of mitigating evidence also would
embrace evidence in support of a claim that the defendant suffered
tragic or horrible circumstances in his or her formative years, such
as abuse,68 neglect, 69 poverty,70 or domestic turbulence, 71 that
might explain the defendant's failure to develop into a fully normal
and law-abiding citizen. Evidence tending to show that a death sen-
tence would be too harsh because the defendant in the past has suc-
ceeded in making a well-behaved and peaceful adjustment to prison
life, 72 is prone only to isolated incidents of violent behavior that can
be controlled or minimized in prison,73 has been willing to confess
or cooperate with authorities in some way,7 4 or otherwise has good
prospects for rehabilitation 75 would find protection in Lockett's defi-
nition. So, too, would evidence of some of the defendant's positive
(1989); NJ. REV. STAT. § 2C:1 1-3c(5)(d) (1982 & Supp. 1990); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-
207(2)(d) (1990).
67 See, e.g., Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 828 (1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting);
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608 (1978) (plurality opinion); Chaney v. Brown, 730
F.2d 1334, 1352-55 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1090 (1984); State v. Gerald, 113
N.J. 40, 104-05, 549 A.2d 792, 825-26 (1988); ALA. CODE § 13A-5-51(4) (1975 & Supp.
1990); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703G.3 (1982 & Supp. 1989); ARE. STAT. ANN. § 5-4-
605(5) (1987); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(j) (West 1988); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 16-11-
103(5)(d) (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a(g)(4) (West 1985); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 921.141(6)(d) (West 1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(c)(4) (West 1986 & Supp.
1990); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 905.5(g) (West 1981 & Supp. 1991); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 99-19-101(6)(d) (1972 & Supp. 1990); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.032.3(4) (Vernon 1979);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-304(6) (1989); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2523(2)(e) (1989); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(f)(4) (1988); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B)(6) (Baldwin
1986); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(e)(7) (1982); S.C. CODE § 16-3-20(C)(b)(4) (1985 &
Supp. 1990); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207(2)(f) (1990); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 10.95.070(4) (1990); Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-102(i)(iv) (1988 & Supp. 1990).
68 See, e.g., Porter v. Wainwright, 805 F.2d 930, 933 (11 th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482
U.S. 918 (1987); Whitley v. Bair, 802 F.2d 1487, 1494 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 951
(1986); Pickens v. Lockhart, 714 F.2d 1455, 1466 (8th Cir. 1983).
69 See, e.g., Armstrong v. Dugger, 833 F.2d 1430, 1433 (11th Cir. 1987); Whitley v.
Bair, 802 F.2d 1487, 1494 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 951 (1986).
70 See, e.g., Whitley v. Bair, 802 F.2d 1487, 1494 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 951
(1986); Goodwin v. Balkcom, 684 F.2d 794, 800 n.4 (11th Cir), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1098
(1982).
71 See, e.g., Porter v. Wainwright, 805 F.2d 930, 933 (1 1th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482
U.S. 918 (1987); Thompson v. Wainwright, 787 F.2d 1447, 1453 (11th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 481 U.S. 1042 (1987); Pickens v. Lockhart, 714 F.2d 1455, 1466 (8th Cir. 1983).
72 See, e.g., Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 7 (1986).
73 See, e.g., Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 82 (1987).
74 See, e.g., Foster v. Strickland, 707 F.2d 1339, 1347 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466
U.S. 993 (1984); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103(5)(h) (1986); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2C:11-
3c(5)(g) (1982 & Supp. 1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-6.H (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15A-2000(f)(8) (1988).
75 See, e.g., Miller v. Wainwright, 798 F.2d 426, 430-31 (11 th Cir. 1986); State v. Da-
vis, 96 N.J. 611, 477 A.2d 308 (1984); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-6.G (1978).
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traits - such as remorse, 76 general good character,77 hardworking
nature,78 success in overcoming considerable hardships, 79 service to
the community8 o or the military, 8l or relatively minor criminal rec-
ord8 2 - that distinguish the defendant from truly incorrigible mur-
derers and commend restraint in imposing the harshest sentence.
The breadth of Lockett's definition of mitigating evidence is jus-
tified. All of the foregoing considerations speak directly to the
moral appropriateness of the death sentence in a particular case and
thus are precisely the type of moral concerns to which a capital sen-
tencing system must be fully open and responsive. Indeed, a capital
sentencing scheme which discounted these considerations would be
infected with the risk of moral error, the very risk which society
found so intolerable as to require rejection of mandatory capital
sentencing. Lockett's definition might be considered underinclusive for
its failure to embrace everything that should be taken into account
to ensure a reliable moral choice between life imprisonment and the
76 See, e.g., Magill v. Dugger, 824 F.2d 879, 889 (11th Cir. 1987); Evans v. Cabana,
821 F.2d 1065, 1071 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1035 (1987).
77 See, e.g., Coleman v. Risley, 839 F.2d 434, 453 n.7 (9th Cir. 1988), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Coleman v. McCormick, 874 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc), cert.
denied, I 10 S. Ct. 349 (1989).
78 See, e.g., Armstrong v. Dugger, 833 F.2d 1430, 1433 (11th Cir. 1987); Tyler v.
Kemp, 755 F.2d 741, 745 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1026 (1985).
79 See, e.g., Johnson v. Wainwright, 806 F.2d 1479, 1483-84 (11th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 872 (1987).
80 See, e.g., Coleman v. Risley, 839 F.2d 434, 453 n.7 (9th Cir. 1988), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Coleman v. McCormick, 874 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 349 (1989).
81 See, e.g., Coleman v. Risley, 839 F.2d 434, 453 n.7 (9th Cir. 1988), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Coleman v. McCormick, 874 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 349 (1989); Laws v. Armontrout, 863 F.2d 1377, 1389-90 (8th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1040 (1989).
82 See, e.g., Coleman v. Risley, 839 F.2d 434, 453 n.7 (9th Cir. 1988), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Coleman v. McCormick, 874 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 349 (1989); Magill v. Dugger, 824 F.2d 879, 889 (1 Ith Cir.), cert. denied,
483 U.S. 1035 (1987); ALA. CODE § 13A-5-51(2) (1975 & Supp. 1990); ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 5-4-605(6) (1987); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 190.3(b), (c) (West 1988); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 16-11-103(5)(g) (1988); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(6)(a) (West 1985); ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, 9-1(c)(1) (1979 & Supp. 1990); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(c)(1) (West 1986 &
Supp. 1990); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 905.5(a) (West 1981 & Supp. 1990); MD. CRiM. LAW
CODE § 413(g)(1) (1988); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(6)(a) (1972 & Supp. 1990); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 565.012.3(1) (Vernon 1979); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-304(1) (1989);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2523(2)(a) (1989); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:511(b)(1) (1986 &
Supp. 1990); NJ. REV. STAT. § 2C:11-3c(5)(f) (1982 & Supp. 1990); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 31-20A-6.A (1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(f)(1) (1988); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2929.04(B)(5) (Baldwin 1986); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(e)(1) (1982); S.C. CODE
§ 16-3-20(C)(b)(1) (1985 & Supp. 1990); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207(2)(a) (1990); VA.
CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4.B(i) (1990); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.070(1) (1990); Wyo.
STAT. § 6-2-102(i)(i) (1988 & Supp. 1990).
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death penalty.83 Attempts to alleviate any perceived overinclusiveness
in the definition, however, could only make matters positively
worse. Any alternative narrower definition would probably be even
more underinclusive, or would reflect impermissibly subjective
value judgments regarding what is and is not mitigating.
Third, Lockett's definition of mitigating evidence is drawn nar-
rowly enough to exclude matters that do not enhance the reliability
of the sentencer's moral decision in any particular case. While there
is some force to the argument that any and all moral considerations
arguing against capital punishment should be open for a capital sen-
tencer's consideration, acceptance of so broad a proposition is not
constitutionally compelled. To achieve confidence in the moral ap-
propriateness of a death sentence for a particular offender and of-
fense, it is not necessary to conduct a mini-referendum on the death
penalty's moral appropriateness as a categorical matter, replete with
litigation over general moral objections to the death penalty unre-
lated to the unique circumstances of the case at hand. The views of
philosophers or the clergy that capital punishment is morally offen-
sive,8 4 evidence that the death penalty in fact does not deter,8 5 and
evidence regarding the gruesomeness of an execution86 exemplify
the kind of generalized objections to capital punishment that fall
outside Lockett's definition of mitigating evidence. A state constitu-
tionally may exclude these objections from the sentencer's consider-
ation because they do not suggest a moral basis for a sentence less
than death in one particular case as opposed to any other.
8 7
83 See infra note 91.
84 See, e.g., State v. Huffstetler, 312 N.C. 92, 322 S.E.2d 110 (1984), cert. denied, 471
U.S. 1009 (1985); State v. Watson, 449 So. 2d 1321 (La. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1181
(1985); People v. Yates, 98 Ill. 2d 502, 456 N.E.2d 1369 (1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 981
(1984); Hill v. State, 275 Ark. 71, 628 S.W.2d 284, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 882 (1982); State
v. Taylor, 304 N.C. 249, 283 S.E.2d 761 (1981), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1213 (1983).
85 See, e.g., State v. Jenkins, 15 Ohio St. 3d 164, 473 N.E.2d 264 (1984), cert. denied,
472 U.S. 1032 (1985); State v. Williams, 305 N.C. 656, 292 S.E.2d 243, cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1056 (1982); State v. Woomer, 278 S.C. 468, 299 S.E.2d 317 (1982), cert. denied, 463
U.S. 1229 (1983); State v. Cherry, 298 N.C. 86, 257 S.E.2d 551 (1979), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 941 (1980).
86 See, e.g., Shriner v. Wainwright, 715 F.2d 1452 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1051 (1984); State v. Boyd, 311 N.C. 408, 319 S.E.2d 189 (1984), cert. denied, 471
U.S. 1030 (1985); Horton v. State, 249 Ga. 871, 295 S.E.2d 281 (1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1188 (1983); State v. Johnson, 298 N.C. 355, 259 S.E.2d 752 (1979).
87 The history of capital punishment might support limiting the evidence in a capital
case to facts relating to the case at hand. Even during the days when juries had unbri-
dled sentencing discretion, defendants did not enjoy a corresponding right to litigate
capital punishment's general morality in unbridled fashion. Judges were forbidden from
suggesting a framework for the jury's deliberations on whether to grant or withhold
mercy, see, e.g., State v. McMillan, 233 N.C. 630, 633, 65 S.E.2d 212, 213 (1951), but they
generally were accorded the authority "to exclude, as irrelevant, evidence not bearing
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The practical significance of generalized evidence about the
morality or advisability of capital punishment seems to lie in its ca-
pacity to make the sentencer more or less susceptible to particular-
ized arguments about the moral appropriateness of the death
penalty in the case at hand. Unquestionably, a sentencer's freedom
from predispositions that will skew its moral determination is of
great constitutional importance. There are, however, means other
than an evidentiary free-for-all for guaranteeing fair-minded
senteficers. Where the jury makes the sentencing decision, for in-
stance, jury selection procedures address this concern,88 as well as
measures to ensure that the jury is instructed on its obligations8 9
and "recognizes the gravity of its task and proceeds with the appro-
priate awareness of its 'truly awesome responsibility.' "90 Thus, the
need for a reliable determination of the death penalty's moral ap-
propriateness in a particular case does not require the capital sen-
on the defendant's character, prior record, or circumstances of his offense." Lockett v.
Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 n.12 (1978) (plurality opinion). Moreover, the practice of
"death qualification" of capital juries was well accepted in the days of unbridled discre-
tion. Jurors who harbored general scruples against the death penalty were not unfit to
serve, but those who made it unmistakably clear that their moral or religious opposition
to capital punishment would prevent them from ever voting to impose a death sentence
could be excused for cause. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968). See also Lock-
hart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986) (affirming constitutionality of the universally fol-
lowed practice of "death qualification"); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 810 (1984)
(holding that correct standard under Witherspoon is that excusals for cause are permissi-
ble whenever a juror's scruples against capital punishment would prevent or substan-
tially impair the juror's performance of his or her duties as a juror in accordance with
the instructions and the oath); Schnapper, Taking Witherspoon Seriously: The Search for
Death-QualifiedJurors, 62 TEx. L. REv. 977, 982 & n.20 (1984). Thus, society's traditional
commitment to discretionary capital sentencing does not argue in favor of making the
morality of capital punishment per se a litigable question in individual cases.
88 See, e.g., Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 (1988) (sixth and fourteenth amendment
right to have prospective juror excused for cause when the juror's favorable views to-
ward death penalty would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his or her
duties as a juror in accordance with the juror's instructions and oath, at least when de-
fense lacks peremptory challenge to excuse the juror); Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28
(1986) (sixth and fourteenth amendment right to voir dire prospective capital jurors on
question of racial bias where case involves interracial crime); Dayan, Mahler &
Widenhouse, Searching for an Impartial Sentencer Through Juty Selection in Capital Trials, 23
Loy. L.A.L. REV. 151 (1989).
89 See, e.g., Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047, 3057 (1990) ("When ajury is the final
sentencer, it is essential that the jurors-be properly instructed regarding all facets of the
sentencing process."); Boyde v. California, 110 S. Ct. 1190, 1198 (1990) (Constitution is
violated where there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury interpreted an ambiguous
instruction in a way that prevents full consideration of evidence that might provide
moral basis for a sentence less than death); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 323 (1989)
(sentencing instructions inadequate to ensure that jury would feel free to consider and
give effect to evidence that might provide moral basis for a sentence less than death).
90 Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 341 (1985) (plurality opinion). See also Saw-
yer v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2822, 2832 (1990) (explaining rule of Caldwell).
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tencing hearing to serve as a forum for examining the morality of
capital punishment as an institution. Such general policy decisions
should be made in political forums. Lockett therefore permits the
states to confine their capital trials to facts and issues related to the
individual offender and offense at hand.91
Fourth, Lockett's definition of mitigating evidence should please
those who value precision and predictability in constitutional rules.
Its clear and fairly objective terms make it a workable tool for trial
91 The eighth amendment may obligate the states, however, to permit sentencers to
consider matters outside the Lockett definition of mitigating evidence. Consider, for ex-
ample, the argument eloquently advanced by Justice Blackmun in favor of permitting the
capital sentencer to dispense mercy without regard to the moral arguments for or
against the death sentence on the facts of the case:
While the sentencer's decision to accord life to a defendant at times might be a
rational or moral one, it also may arise from the defendant's appeal to the sen-
tencer's sympathy or mercy, human qualities that are undeniably emotional in na-
ture .... The sentencer's ability to respond with mercy towards a defendant has
always struck me as a particularly valuable aspect of the capital sentencing proce-
dure .... [Wie see in the sentencer's expression of mercy a distinctive feature of
our society that we deeply value.
California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 561-63 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also
Note, Reviving Mercy in the Structure of Capital Punishment, 99 YALE LJ. 389, 395-98 (1989).
Were the Court to accept Justice Blackmun's position, it apparently would not be to
prevent the imposition of morally inappropriate death sentences. See Saffle v. Parks, 110
S. Ct. 1257 (1990) (to require that capital sentencer be free to base decision upon sym-
pathy for defendant would necessitate the development of a "new rule" of constitutional
law). Strong arguments also can be made that the eighth amendment requires admis-
sion of information about the parole eligibility rules that would apply to the defendant if
he were sentenced to life rather than death. Admission may be required even if, as some
courts have held, this information does not fall within Lockett's definition because it is
not a fact about the offender or the offense. See Paduano & Stafford Smith, Deathly Er-
rors: Juror Misconceptions Concerning Parole in the Imposition of the Death Penalty, 18 COLUM.
HUM. RTs. L. REv. 211, 231-38, 244-49 (1987); see also Note, The Meaning of "Life"for
Virginia Jurors and Its Effect on Reliability in Capital Sentencing, 75 VA. L. REv. 1605 (1989).
The extent to which a state may expand the scope of its capital sentencing hearing
beyond matters relating to the individual offender or offense is a question largely unex-
plored, although some things have been said in the cases. As a substantive matter, the
Court on two occasions advanced the proposition that the states cannot allow factors
"wholly unrelated to the blameworthiness of a particular defendant" to be placed before
the sentencer in support of a death sentence. See South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S.
805, 810-11 (1989) (sentencer's consideration of victim impact evidence that is unre-
lated to defendant's personal culpability is barred by the eighth amendment); Booth v.
Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 504 (1987) (same). This proposition is in some doubt given the
Court's recent decision in Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991). In Payne, the
Court overruled Booth and Gathers insofar as they held inadmissible evidence of the spe-
cific harm done by the defendant offered in the form of victim impact evidence. The
Court reasoned that "a State may properly conclude that for the jury to assess meaning-
fully the defendant's moral culpability and blameworthiness," it should have such evi-
dence before it. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2608. As a procedural matter, due process dictates
that the defense must be allowed to review and deny or explain any factor which the
sentencer is permitted to take into account in the sentencing decision. Skipper v. South
Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 5 n.1 (1986); id. at 10-11 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment);
Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
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and reviewing courts alike. Whether a fact is about an individual's
character or record or offense is as straightforward a question as a
judge will face. Whether the fact might suggest a conceivable moral
argument against imposing the death penalty involves a bit more
judgment, but jurists mindful of the wide range of moral views
should not experience much difficulty administering Lockett's
broadly inclusive standard.
B. THE REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO THE TREATMENT OF MITIGATING
EVIDENCE
Lockett and its progeny impose four requirements regarding the
treatment of mitigating evidence in capital sentencing. The first two
work in tandem toward a single objective: empowering the sentencer to
make a reliable moral decision. They are well framed to ensure that re-
gardless of how a state structures its capital sentencing procedure,
the sentencer (whether jury, judge or perhaps even appellate
court92) retains the discretion to reject the death penalty when it is
morally inappropriate for the particular offender or offense.
First, the Lockett doctrine mandates that the sentencer must be
free to "consider" any and all mitigating evidence - that is, to think
upon and weigh the evidence, and to determine in light of the evi-
dence whether death is the "reasoned moral response to the defend-
ant's background, character, and crime."93 Consequently, virtually
anything that is reasonably likely to impede the sentencer's consid-
eration of mitigating evidence, as defined by Lockett, violates the
eighth amendment.94
92 See Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047 (1990) (jury sentencing not constitutionally
required in capital cases); Clemons v. Mississippi, 110 S. Ct. 1441, 1451 (1990) (consti-
tutionally permissible for appellate courts to reweigh aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances and thus serve as second sentencer, although they may face "certain difficulties
in determining sentencing questions in the first instance").
93 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989) (quoting California v. Brown, 479
U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis in original)).
94 See, e.g., McKoy v. North Carolina, 110 S. Ct. 1227 (1990) (unconstitutional to
prevent individual jurors from considering, in ultimate sentencing decision, evidence
which all twelve jurors do not agree has mitigating value); Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S.
367 (1988) (same); Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987) (where jury is to recom-
mend sentence subject to potential override by trial judge, it is unconstitutional for
judge to instruct jury not to consider certain mitigating evidence in ultimate sentencing
decision and for judge himself to refuse to consider that mitigating evidence); Eddings
v. Oklahoma, 494 U.S. 104 (1982) (unconstitutional for sentencing judge to refuse to
consider mitigating evidence on theory that state law prohibited its consideration). See
also Boyde v. California, 110 S. Ct. 1190, 1198 (1990) (eighth amendment is violated
where there is a reasonable likelihood that sentencing jury applied an instruction in a
way that prevented the consideration of mitigating evidence).
The only recognized exception to the requirement that there be no barrier to the
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Second, the doctrine mandates that the sentencer must be able
to "give effect" to mitigating evidence, for " 'the right to have the
sentencer consider and weigh relevant mitigating evidence would be
meaningless unless the sentencer was also permitted to give effect to
its consideration' in imposing sentence." 95 Thus, the sentencer
must be "provided with a vehicle for expressing its 'reasoned moral
response' to [mitigating] evidence in rendering its sentencing deci-
sion. "96 There is a straightforward test for determining whether the
sentencer was able to "give effect" to mitigating evidence in a par-
ticular case. The reviewing court should draw from each item of
mitigating evidence presented a list of all reasons that might argue
against the moral appropriateness of the death sentence for that
particular offender or offense. For each reason on the list, the court
should then ask whether a reasonable sentencer would have be-
lieved itself legally authorized, based upon the laws meant to govern
its decision and its obligation to obey those laws, 97 to return a life
sentence for that reason alone if satisfied that the reason rendered
the death sentence inappropriate. If the answer for even one reason
on the list is "no," the sentencer did not have a vehicle for expres-
sing its reasoned moral responses to mitigating evidence, and the
eighth amendment accordingly was violated.98
Of course, dependable moral determinations will not necessar-
ily be achieved simply by empowering the sentencer to consider and
give effect to all the mitigating evidence in the case. Thus, while the
first two Lockett requirements seek to empower the sentencer to make
a reliable moral decision, the third and fourth Lockett requirements
serve a different but related purpose: enhancing the likelihood that the
sentencer's consideration of mitigating evidence is that a state may insist that only evi-
dence which has been shown to be more likely than not true be taken into account.
Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047 (1990).
95 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 321 (1989) (quoting Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487
U.S. 164, 185 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment)). See also Lockett v. Ohio,
438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (plurality opinion) (sentencer must be free to give mitigating
evidence "independent mitigating weight").
96 Penry, 492 U.S. at 329.
97 Where the sentencer is a jury, the governing law of course will be found in the
court's instructions. See, e.g., Penry, 492 U.S. 302 (instructions to jury unconstitutional
for failing to provide a vehicle for consideration of certain mitigating evidence). Where
a judge or a group ofjudges is performing the sentencing function, the governing law
will be found in the substantive law of the jurisdiction as revealed in statutes, rules, and
judicial decisions. See, e.g., Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047, 3057 (1990) (where sen-
tencing is done by judges, they are "presumed to know the law, and to apply it in making
their decisions").
98 The leading case illustrating this process is Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
See also Oregon v. Wagner, 309 Or. 5, 786 P.2d 93 (1982), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 212
(1990) (finding constitutional error under Penry).
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sentencer in fact will make a reliable moral decision. As a corollary to the
requirement that the sentencer not be barred from considering any
mitigating evidence, the Lockett doctrine's third requirement man-
dates that the sentencer itself may not refuse to consider any miti-
gating evidence presented in a case. 99 Although the sentencer is
free to decide that mitigating evidence does not warrant a sentence
less than death - were this not so, there would be no reason to
have a sentencer - the sentencer cannot refuse to take mitigating
evidence into account. In practice, this means that a death sentence
cannot stand when the record reveals a reasonable likelihood that
the sentencer refused to consider all the mitigating evidence. 10 0
Lockett's insistence that the sentencer attend to its moral mission is
scarcely objectionable. An unconstitutional risk of moral error in
capital sentencing arises whenever the sentencer fails to consider all
the mitigating evidence; this risk is no less real or pernicious when
the fault lies with an able but unwilling sentencer. °10
The fourth Lockett requirement mandates that the defense can-
99 Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4 (1986) ("Equally clear is the corollary rule
that the sentencer may not refuse to consider... 'any relevant mitigating evidence.' ")
(citation omitted).
100 Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), provides the choicest example of such
a case. In the majority's estimation of the record, the sentencing judge as well as the
state appellate court had operated on the premise that certain mitigating evidence could
not be considered as a matter of law, and not merely on the grounds that the evidence
was unworthy of belief or of insubstantial weight. Lockett principles, the Court accord-
ingly held, had been violated. Id- at 112-14. Justice O'Connor, concurring, took the
view that even if the record were ambiguous as to whether the sentencing judge and
appellate court had refused to consider mitigating evidence on erroneous grounds, con-
stitutional error nonetheless was established because "Woodson and Lockett require us to
remove any legitimate basis for finding ambiguity concerning the factors actually consid-
ered." Id. at 119 (O'Connor, J, concurring).
Although the Court in Eddings did not articulate a clear standard for dealing with
allegations that a sentencer has refused to consider mitigating evidence in violation of
Lockett, later developments suggest that the justices would find the Constitution violated
where there is a "reasonable likelihood" that the sentencer has disregarded mitigating
evidence categorically. In Boyde v. California, 110 S. Ct. 1190, 1198 (1990), the Court
concluded that a jury instruction is unconstitutional when there is a "reasonable likeli-
hood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the
consideration of constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence." Because Boyde rests
upon the uncontroversial proposition that the Constitution forbids a death sentence
where there is a reasonable likelihood that mitigating evidence has gone unconsidered,
it follows that the Constitution also is violated where the record reveals a reasonable
likelihood that the capital sentencer refused to consider all the mitigating evidence.
101 "Whatever the cause.... the conclusion would necessarily be the same: 'Because
the [sentencer's] failure to consider all of the mitigating 'evidence risks erroneous impo-
sition of the death sentence, in plain violation of Lockett, it is our duty to remand this
case for resentencing.' " Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 375 (1988) (quoting Eddings
v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 117 n.* (1982) (O'ConnorJ, concurring)). AccordMcKoy v.
North Carolina, 110 S. Ct. 1227, 1233 (1990).
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not be prevented from introducing any mitigating evidence.10 2 Ap-
parently implicit in this requirement, although the Court has not
squarely decided the point, is a mandate that the defense cannot be
denied an opportunity to argue before the sentencer the asserted
significance and desired effect of the mitigating evidence
presented.' 0 3 Given the typical capital defendant's strong incentive
to avoid the death penalty, this requirement helps ensure that a
wide range of mitigating evidence will be developed before the sen-
tencer. The result is an increased likelihood that the sentencer will
possess and appreciate the information necessary to make a moral
decision deserving of society's confidence.
Admittedly, compliance with Lockett's requirements will not
fully secure the constitutional objective of ensuring that all death
sentences imposed are morally appropriate. The confidence that
society places in a decision to impose the death penalty depends
upon many other factors, including particularly the quality of the
defendant's attorney and the resources available to help that attor-
ney. 10 4 Empowering the capital sentencer to respond favorably to
the defendant's mitigating pleas nonetheless is a necessary and sub-
stantial step toward the goal. The Lockett doctrine enhances capital
punishment's moral reliability.
In addition, the Lockett requirements are commendable for their
administrative ease. To determine whether each requirement is met
in a particular case, one need only answer four discrete questions.
Was anything reasonably likely to have impeded the sentencer's
consideration of mitigating evidence? Did the sentencer have a ve-
hicle for giving effect to each item of mitigating evidence? Is there a
reasonable likelihood that the sentencer refused to consider any
mitigating evidence? Was the defense prevented from presenting
any mitigating evidence? While these questions do not foreclose
the possibility of legitimate differences of opinion in a given case
102 See, e.g., Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986) (unconstitutional for trial
judge to prevent defendant from placing mitigating evidence before sentencing jury).
See also Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979) (unconstitutional to employ hearsay rule
to exclude reliable mitigating evidence).
103 See Boyde v. California, 110 S. Ct. 1190, 1199-1200 (1990) (while finding no con-
stitutional violation, Court notes that the "[p]resentation of mitigating evidence alone,
of course, does not guarantee that a jury will feel entitled to consider that evidence,"
and stresses that defendant "had an opportunity ... to argue" the significance of his
background and character).
104 There is serious doubt that the legal assistance that capital defendants receive is
adequate to produce the reliable sentencing determinations envisioned under the eighth
amendment. See, e.g., Bright, Death by Lottery - Procedural Bar of Constitutional Claims in




(what legal questions, let alone legal questions of constitutional di-
mension, ever do?), the questions aspire toward objectivity. Lockett
provides state judges who conduct capital trials or review them on
direct appeal with standards that are neither vague nor ambiguous.
In addition, Lockett's clarity and precision allow federal jurists to ap-
ply Lockett on certiorari or in habeas corpus without worrying that
granting relief to a condemned inmate for a Lockett violation will of-
fend some legitimate concept of federalism.
The most impressive proof of the Lockett doctrine's theoretical
soundness, clarity, and workability might well be the Supreme
Court's consistent application of the doctrine. As noted earlier, in
every Supreme Court Term from 1986 to 1990 a condemned inmate
has obtained relief for a Lockett violation. 10 5 The Court enforced
Lockett principles in each of these cases even though a ruling
favorable to the defendant was likely to require the reversal of many
other death sentences.10 6 While the Court's adherence to Lockett
might be attributable to nothing more than respect for stare decisis,
extreme deference to precedent is not the current Court's style.
More likely, the Court continues to believe that Lockett makes good
constitutional sense.
V. THE CAPITAL SENTENCING FRAMEWORK STRUCTURED BY
LOCKErT. THE LIMITED ROLE OF THE REVIEWING COURT
AND THE INAPPROPRIATENESS OF CONVENTIONAL
HARMLESS ERROR ANALYSIS
The Lockett doctrine's value in the capital sentencing process is
structural and systemic rather than substantive. As noted above, the
doctrine is virtually devoid of substantive content; it does not pur-
port to define the circumstances in which the death sentence is mor-
ally appropriate. Instead, Lockett establishes the structural
framework within which capital sentencing decisions are to be made.
It lays out the minimum procedural conditions which must be met
before a decision to impose the death penalty constitutionally can
be relied upon.
The fact that Lockett performs this structuring role in capital
sentencing has significant implications for the way the doctrine op-
erates within the criminal justice system. First, the capital sentenc-
ing framework which Lockett establishes defines and demarcates the
respective roles of the capital sentencer and the reviewing courts.
The capital sentencer is charged with assessing the substantive mor-
105 See cases cited supra hote 9.
106 See supra note 10.
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ality of the death sentence in a particular case. Reviewing courts, on
the other hand, generally assess only the legality of any death sen-
tence imposed by ensuring that the sentencer met Lockett's constitu-
tionally mandated procedural requirements. Second, the Lockett
doctrine's role as an arbiter and enforcer of minimum procedural
requirements for capital sentencers, coupled with the heightened
confidence which society must have in any decision to impose the
death penalty, dictates that Lockett violations must require automatic
reversal. Thus, when a Lockett error occurs, there is no need to en-
gage in conventional harmless error analysis.
A. THE LIMITED ROLE OF THE REVIEWING COURT
The goal of imposing only morally appropriate death sentences
is impossible to meet until someone provides substantive content to
the c6ncept of moral appropriateness. Lockett assigns this task to the
capital sentencer alone. Through Lockett, reviewing courts in capital
cases can push the hard moral choices upon a sentencer whose sub-
stantive moral determination will receive unimpeachable respect in
all but the rarest cases. 107 Needless to say, the awesome power to
make unreviewable determinations of this gravity cannot be placed
in the hands ofjust anybody who happens to claim the title of capi-
tal sentencer. Lockett consequently charges reviewing courts with
the task of ensuring that the capital sentencer meets the minimum
constitutional qualifications for the job. No special moral expertise
is required of the sentencer; indeed, it is doubtful we would recog-
nize such expertise if ever we were confronted with it. A capital sen-
tencer is not permitted to make unreviewablemoral determinations,
however, unless and until it has been shown that the sentencer was
able and willing to "consider[] . . .the character and record of the
individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense
[as] a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting
the penalty of death."108 Thus, under Lockett, the sentencer and the
reviewing courts are consigned to what each can do better. The
sentencer attends to the substantive morality of each death sentence
imposed, while the reviewing courts police the sentencer to ensure
107 The rare exceptions are cases in which the defendant is deemed constitutionally
immune from the death penalty because the offense was not sufficiently severe, see, e.g.,
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (death penalty unconstitutionally disproportion-
ate for rape of adult victim), or because the offender was not sufficiently culpable, see,
e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (juvenile offender held immune from
capital punishment in absence of specific legislative determination that juveniles should
be eligible for death penalty).




its compliance with fundamental procedural requirements.' 0 9
Judges undoubtedly take comfort in the distance that Lockett puts
between them and the substantive morality of individual death
sentences. In several leading cases in the Lockett line, a defendant
asked the justices to hold the death penalty morally inappropriate
for a particular category of offender and therefore forbidden as a
matter of law. In Lockett, for example, the defendant urged that the
death penalty was so manifestly excessive for a felony murderer who
neither performed the killing nor intended that it occur as to be per
se unconstitutional." 0  In Eddings v. Oklahoma, the justices were
asked to find the death penalty inappropriate for any juvenile of-
fender.'11 And in Penry v. Lynaugh, the defendant contended that
capital punishment is fundamentally inappropriate for a mentally re-
tarded offender." 2 The Court rejected each of these categorical
claims. The justices avoided making substantive moral decisions in
these cases by expressing confidence that capital sentencers can take
full account of all possible moral considerations when rendering de-
cisions in particular cases.1 1
3
109 Under certain circumstances, a state may allow an appellate court to act as both a
reviewing court and a capital sentencer in cases where the sentence imposed by the trial-
level sentencer is found to be constitutionally infirm. Even in these cases, however, the
appellate court does not perform appellate review of the morality of the trial-level sen-
tencer's decision. Instead, after determining (as a traditional reviewing court) that the
sentence imposed by the trial-level sentencer is unconstitutional and cannot be affirmed,
the appellate court (now acting as a capital. sentencer) makes its own assessment of the
morally appropriate punishment by "reweighing" the facts of the case. See the discus-
sion of Clemons v. Mississippi infra at text accompanying notes 136-140.
110 438 U.S. 586, 624 (1978) (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and
concurring in judgment).
I11 455 U.S. 104, 110 n.5 (1982).
112 492 U.S. 302, 336-40 (1989).
113 See, e.g., Lockett, 438 U.S. at 615-16 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in judgment) (rather than rule categorically that nontriggerman felony murderer is
ineligible for death penalty, "[t]he more manageable alternative, in my view, is to follow
a proceduralist tack, and require ... that the sentencing authority have discretion to
consider the degree of the defendant's participation in the acts leading to the homicide
and the character of the defendant's mens rea"); Eddings, 455 U.S. at 113-14 n.9 (Court
views defendant's more sweeping challenge - the claim that the death penalty is consti-
tutionally excessive when imposed upon a juvenile - as "compris[ing]" the narrower
contention "that the sentencer erred in refusing to consider relevant mitigating circum-
stances"); Penty, 492 U.S. at 335-36 (opinion of O'Connor, J.) (while Court cannot cate-
gorically prohibit the imposition of the death penalty upon a mentally retarded
defendant because "it cannot be said on the record before us that all mentally retarded
people, by definition, can never act with the level of culpability associated with the death
penalty," the sentencer nonetheless must be free to consider mental retardation as a
mitigating circumstance). See also Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 373-75 (1989)
(plurality opinion) (suggesting that society is satisfied to deal with moral objections
against the death penalty for a juvenile offender by allowing the sentencer to take them
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B. THE INAPPROPRIATENESS OF CONVENTIONAL HARMLESS ERROR
ANALYSIS
Given the way Lockett demarcates the roles of the capital sen-
tencer and the reviewing courts, any Lockett violation necessarily
constitutes reversible error. A Lockett violation therefore need not
be further analyzed under the standard of Chapman v. California114 to
determine whether the error was harmless in the sense that the sen-
tencer would have reached the same result had the error not oc-
curred. Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly confirmed
this proposition,' 15 the doctrine's structure dictates such a conclu-
up on a case-by-case basis when giving individualized consideration to a particular de-
fendant's youthful age).
114 386 U.S. 18 (1967). Under Chapman, the "beneficiary of a constitutional error
[must] prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute
to the verdict obtained." Id. at 24. It is unclear how much latitude Chapman's outcome-
oriented standard gives an appellate court to independently evaluate the weight of the
evidence in assessing the probable effect of a constitutional error. See Stacy & Dayton,
Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 79, 127-31 (1988). Some
courts, reading the Chapman standard expansively, find constitutional error harmless
when convinced that the decision reached by ajury was nonetheless the "correct result."
This approach is criticized because it displaces the jury's independent judgment. Id at
127-28. Courts which take a narrower view of the appellate court's role "ask the empiri-
cal question of whether the constitutional error affected the jury that actually convicted
the defendant." Id. at 128.
115 To date, the Supreme Court has not faced the question squarely. In every case in
which a Lockett violation has been established, the Court has reversed the death sen-
tence. The Court has never held a violation- of the Lockett doctrine to be harmless, and it
has never held that relief for Lockett error depends upon an assessment of case-specific
prejudice to the defendant.
Until 1986 there was not even a hint in the Court's opinions that a Lockett error
could be anything other than automatic reversible error. In that year, Justice White's
opinion for the Court in Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986), addressed the
State's suggestion that exclusion of the defendant's proffered mitigating evidence of
good behavior in jail after his arrest was not erroneous or in any event was harmless
because it was "merely cumulative." The State's position was dismissed because "it ap-
pear[ed] reasonably likely that the exclusion of the evidence ... may have affected the
jury's decision to impose the death sentence [and] [t]hus, under any standard, the exclu-
sion of the evidence was sufficiently prejudicial to constitute reversible error." Id. at 8.
Since Skipper, a few matters of particular note on the subject have appeared in the
Court's opinions. In Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987),Justice Scalia's opinion
for a unanimous Court contained dictum in which he construed the Court's precedents
as leaving open the possibility that Lockett error might be excused as harmless. 481 U.S.
at 399 ("Respondent has made no attempt to argue that this error was harmless, or that
it had no effect on the jury or the sentencing judge. In the absence of such a showing
our cases hold that the exclusion of mitigating evidence of the sort at issue here renders
the death sentence invalid.").
In McNeil v. North Carolina, 110 S. Ct. 1516 (1990), Justice Kennedy, joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Scalia, dissented from an order va-
cating the death sentence and remanding the case for further consideration in light of
McKoy v. North Carolina, 110 S. Ct. 1227 (1990). McKoy struck down a state sentencing
requirement that jurors consider only that mitigating evidence which they unanimously
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sion. When a Lockett error occurs, the institutional figure charged
with the responsibility for making a substantive moral judgment re-
garding the death penalty's moral appropriateness - the sentencer
- is proved to have been insufficiently empowered or insufficiently
likely to return a death sentence deserving of constitutional respect.
By definition, the defendant who establishes a Lockett violation dem-
onstrates a potential for error in the sentencer's moral judgment
that fatally undermines confidence in that judgment and therefore
mandates reversal. Justice O'Connor made precisely this point for a
majority of the Court in Penry v. Lynaugh:
Our reasoning in Lockett and Eddings thus compels a remand for resen-
tencing so that we do not "risk that the death penalty will be imposed
in spite of factors which may call for a less severe penalty."... "When
the choice is between life and death, that risk is unacceptable and in-
compatible with the commands of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments." 116
The concept of a rule of constitutional criminal procedure
which is structured so that any violation of the rule necessarily cre-
agree exists. In his dissent,Justice Kennedy raised the possibility that reversal might not
be required "where a unanimity requirement may have been harmless due to failure to
present mitigating evidence." McNeil, 110 S. Ct. at 1516 (Kennedy, J., dissenting with
respect to granting of certiorari and vacating and remanding of case).
Despite Justice Kennedy's use of the word "harmless," it is doubtful that he in-
tended to endorse the groundbreaking proposition that a Lockett violation can be ex-
cused if the sentencer would have reached the same conclusion had the violation not
occurred. Justice Kennedy more likely meant only that errors under McKoy might not
necessitate reversals where it can be said beyond a reasonable doubt that no mitigating
evidence actually was precluded - a much narrower and not altogether unfamiliar prop-
osition. If no evidence actually was precluded, the sentence can be affirmed because it
can be said confidently that the sentencer was able and willing to take account of all
mitigating evidence. Affirming a sentence in such a situation is markedly different from
affirming a sentence in a case where mitigating evidence in fact was precluded but the
reviewing court feels that the sentencer would have decided the case the same way even
without the constitutional error. Compare Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (rever-
sal of death sentence required because Texas three-question sentencing scheme failed
to provide vehicle for jury to give effect to all aspects of the mitigating evidence actually
in the case), with Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164 (1988) (reversal of death sentence
not required although very same Texas scheme used because, unlike Penry, all aspects of
the mitigating evidence in Franklin's case could be given effect by the jury), andJurek v.
Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (Texas scheme not unconstitutional on its face because ca-
pable of interpretation to comply fully with Lockett principles as enunciated in Woodson
v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976)).
116 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1988) (citations omitted). Accord McKoy v. North Carolina, 110
S. Ct. 1227, 1233 (1990) (because violation of Lockett doctrine "risks erroneous imposi-
tion of the death sentence, ... it is our duty to remand this case for resentencing;" no
harmless error analysis undertaken); Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 375 (1988) (same).
See also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 117 (1982) (upon finding Lockett error, re-
mand is required because "the state courts must consider all relevant mitigating evi-
dence and weigh it against the evidence of aggravating circumstances. We do not weigh
the evidence for them.").
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ates an unacceptable risk of an adversely affected outcome, thus re-
quiring automatic reversal, is not novel. There are rules of
constitutional criminal procedure for which a violation of the rule,
by definition, embodies a finding of potential prejudice to the de-
fendant sufficient to undermine confidence in the case's outcome. A
violation of the sixth amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel, for example, by formulation embodies a finding of a "rea-
sonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different."' 17 Similarly, a
due process violation based upon the government's failure to dis-
close exculpatory evidence to the defense by formulation requires
proof of a "reasonable probability that, had the evidence been dis-
closed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been
different."118 These constitutional errors are not subject to "harm-
lessness" analysis under Chapman to determine whether a different
result might have been reached in the absence of constitutional er-
ror. Because establishment of one of these errors necessarily estab-
lishes a "reasonable probability" that the case's outcome was
affected, and because this "reasonable probability" is defined as "a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome,"1 19
reversal is required upon the showing of error.
Unlike the automatically reversible errors discussed above, a
Lockett violation does not explicitly embody a finding of a probability
of adverse effect upon the judgment that is "sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome." But establishment of a Lockett violation
does implicitly embody such a finding. Where Lockett is violated, the
reviewing court has found the capital sentencer to have been unable
or unwilling to reach a reliable moraljudgment. Since only the cap-
ital sentencer is authorized to assess the moral appropriateness of
the death penalty, and since its judgment cannot be trusted because
of Lockett error, the reviewing court has no choice but to order that a
new sentencing determination be made by a constitutionally ade-
quate capital sentencer. Reversal and resentencing are required.
The eighth amendment requires a uniquely high degree of con-
fidence in the moral appropriateness of any death sentence im-
posed, for the death sentence - unlike any other judgment
rendered in our criminal or civil courts - calls for an incomparably
severe and uniquely irrevocable action.120 Thus, while our legal sys-
117 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).
118 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
119 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. See 3 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§ 26.6, at 67 (Supp. 1989).
120 The "qualitative difference between death and other penalties calls for a greater
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tem customarily demands assurances that a constitutional error has
not adversely affected the outcome of a case and thereby produced
an unwarranted conviction or incarceration, it demands even
stronger assurances that no defect in the sentencing process has led
to a morally unwarranted decision to kill a human being in the name
of punishment. It follows that a correspondingly lesser degree of
potential adverse affect upon the judgment suffices to undermine
confidence in a decision to impose a death sentence than is required
for any other type of judgment. The risk that a Lockett error may
have resulted in the imposition of a morally inappropriate death
sentence need not even amount to a "reasonable probability."
Given the singular gravity of capital punishment, the mere possibil-
ity that the unconstitutional handicaps imposed upon the sentencer
adversely affected its moral judgment is troubling. This possibility
of moral error, inherent whenever a Lockett violation is established,
is constitutionally unacceptable because there is virtually no sub-
stantive federal review of a sentencer's moral determination and
thus no other safeguard against an actual error in moral judgment
by the sentencer.
Further reason to believe that Lockett violations must constitute
automatically reversible error can be found in the Supreme Court's
recent treatment of the law under Caldwell v. Mississippi,121 an analo-
gous eighth amendment capital punishment doctrine. Caldwell holds
that a death sentence cannot stand where the sentencing jury has
been given misleading information about its role in the sentencing
process that allows it to devalue its responsibility for the sentencing
decision. 122 In Caldwell, for example, the prosecutor and the trial
judge incorrectly suggested to the sentencing jurors that a decision
to impose the death sentence would be subject to plenary appellate
review. Such misinformation creates a decided yet immeasurable
risk - "an intolerable danger" - that the jurors will minimize the
importance of their decision 123 and return a death sentence that
degree of reliability when the death sentence is imposed." Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion). Accord Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 9-10
(1989); California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-99 (1983).
121 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
122 Id. at 328-30; id. at 343 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring injudg-
ment). See also Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 407-08 (1989); Darden v. Wainwright,
477 U.S. 168, 184 n.15 (1986).
123 Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 333. The jurors might have erroneously believed that "the
authoritative determination of whether death was appropriate" would be made by the
appellate court and not by the jury. Id. at 343 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment). See also Mello, Taking Caldwell v. Mississippi Seriously: The Un-
constitutionality of Capital Statutes That Divide Sentencing Responsibility Between Judge and Juty,
30 B.C.L. REv. 283 (1989).
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does not represent a considered individualized assessment of the
morally appropriate punishment.124 Thus, both Caldwell and Lockett
are designed to satisfy the need for heightened confidence in the
capital sentencer's moral decision. Each identifies and proscribes
circumstances which create unresolvable doubts about the sen-
tencer's ability or willingness to make a reliable moral determina-
tion. In light of the functional and structural similarities between
Caldwell and Lockett, it is reasonable to conclude that if a violation of
one of these rules constitutes automatic reversible error, a violation
of the other should be automatically reversible as well.
Statements made toward the close of the 1989 Term indicate
that if faced with the issue, the justices would find Caldwell violations
to be automatic reversible error. In Sawyer v. Smith, 125 a case nomi-
nally concerned with the issue of Caldwell's retroactive application,
four members of the Court expressed their belief that Caldwell viola-
tions are automatically reversible. 126 The remaining justices, form-
ing the majority in Sawyer, stopped short of making so explicit a
declaration; it would have been unnecessary to the Sawyer holding.
The majority opinion contains language, however, which logically
compels the conclusion that Caldwell errors are automatically
reversible.
Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Sawyer majority observed:
Caldwell ... must be read as providing an additional measure of protection
against error, beyond that afforded by [the due process clause's protec-
tion against fundamentally unfair proceedings], in the special context
of capital sentencing. The Caldwell rule was designed as an enhance-
ment of the accuracy of capital sentencing, a protection of systemic value
for state and federal courts charged with reviewing capital
proceedings. 127
This eloquent testimonial precludes any contention that a Cald-
well violation may be excused for want of actual prejudice to the
case's outcome. A rule which requires a reviewing court to find
some actual prejudice before remedying a violation provides no
124 Misinformation of the sort prohibited by Caldwell " 'presents] an intolerable dan-
ger that the jury will in fact choose to minimize the importance of its role,' a view that
would be fundamentally incompatible with the Eighth Amendment requirement that the
jury make an individualized decision that death is the appropriate punishment in a spe-
cific case." Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 184 n.15 (1986) (quoting Caldwell, 472
U.S. at 333).
125 110 S. Ct. 2822 (1990).
126 Id. at 2837 (Marshall,J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, Blackmun and Stevens,JJ.)
("Caldwell denies . . . that 'focused, unambiguous, and strong. . .' prosecutorial argu-
ments that mislead a jury about its sentencing role in the capital context can ever be
deemed harmless").
127 Id. at 2832 (citation omitted) (emphases supplied).
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"additional measure of protection against error" and has no "sys-
temic value" for reviewing courts over and above the protections
already afforded by principles of due process. The due process
clause already safeguards a defendant from improper conduct that
is shown to have actually prejudiced the trial.' 28 Caldwell can pro-
vide "additional ... protection" against sentencing error and have
"systemic value" for reviewing courts only if it conclusively
presumes prejudice and thereby relieves reviewing courts of case-
specific prejudice inquiries, including harmless error analysis.
The Sawyer opinion emphasizes that what makes Caldwell special
is its lack of concern with demonstrable prejudice to the defendant.
"Rather than focusing on the prejudice to the defendant, .. . [the]
concern in Caldwell [is] with the 'unacceptable risk' that misleading
remarks could affect the reliability of the sentence."' 29 What sets
Caldwell apart from other criminal procedure rules and compels the
conclusion that it is a doctrine of automatic reversal is also true of
Lockett. Like Caldwell, Lockett is not concerned with any demonstrable
case-specific prejudice to the defendant. Instead, Lockett is con-
cerned with the "unacceptable risk" that the sentencer's inability or
refusal to consider and give effect to mitigating evidence might have
affected the reliability of its moral judgment. 13
The Supreme Court has never held that a Lockett violation can
be dismissed for want of sufficient impact upon a case's actual out-
come.' 31 Furthermore, the death penalty cases in which the Court
has applied Chapman's harmless error analysis are readily distin-
guishable, for none involved the violation of rules designed to en-
128 See, e.g., Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 180, 183 n.15 (1986) ("undoubtedly
*.. improper" prosecutorial arguments did not violate due process because they did not
render trial unfair "in the context of the facts and cirucmstances of this case"); Donnelly
v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974) (challenged prosecutorial remarks, after
"examination of the entire proceedings in this case," not shown to have resulted in
denial of a fair trial).
129 Sawyer, 110 S. Ct. at 2832.
130 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (plurality opinion).
131 A distinguishable situation exists in cases like Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164
(1988), where reversal is not required because a procedural device with the capacity to
violate Lockett is shown to have had no such effect in fact; the procedural device as ap-
plied in the actual case did not preclude the sentencer's ability to consider or give effect
to any mitigating evidence. In such cases, the sentencer actually considered all mitigat-
ing evidence, and its determination thus can be relied upon. Cf Carella v. California,
491 U.S. 263, 269 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (where jury given instruc-
tion that unconstitutionally alleviates the prosecution's burden of proof, no need to re-
verse conviction if the instruction can be shown to have had no effect in the narrow
sense that the jury in fact would not have relied upon the instruction; distinguishing, and
finding inappropriate, analysis for harmless error on theory of overwhelming evidence).
See supra note 115.
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sure the sentencer's ability and willingness to render a reliable
moral decision.13 2 Still, the current Supreme Court majority has
tended to favor actual prejudice inquiries as a way to minimize fed-
eral constitutional interference with the primarily state business of
bringing criminals to justice,1 33 and has exhibited a desire to curtail
federal court reversals of capital cases.' 34 Some of the justices may
therefore consider recrafting Lockett to make it less than a rule of
automatic reversal. 135
132 In Clemons v. Mississippi, 110 S. Ct. 1441 (1990), and Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S.
862 (1983), for instance, the error was the use of an unconstitutionally vague aggravat-
ing circumstance in violation of the eighth amendment's mandate that the class of mur-
derers eligible for the death penalty be narrowed in advance. See Blystone v.
Pennsylvania, 110 S. Ct. 1078, 1083 (1990); Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244
(1988). In Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249 (1988), the error was the introduction of
evidence obtained in violation of the defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel
under Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981). While such errors can, depending upon the
context, have an impact upon the sentencer's choice of sentence, they do not signal, as
do violations of Lockett or Caldwell, a risk that the sentencer's capacity to render a reliable
moral decision has been impaired.
133 Of the harmless error doctrine, the Court has said the following:
As we have stressed on more than one occasion, the Constitution entitles a criminal
defendant to a fair trial, not a perfect one.... The harmless-error doctrine recog-
nizes the principle that the central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual
question of the defendant's guilt or innocence... and promotes public respect for
the criminal process by focusing on the underlying fairness of the trial rather than
on the virtually inevitable presence of immaterial error.
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986). See also Arizona v. Fulminante, 111
S. Ct. 1246, 1264 (1991) (opinion of the Court per Rehnquist, C.J., on applicability of
harmless error analysis to erroneous admission of involuntary confession); Satterwhite
v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 256 (1988); Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577 (1986).
Similar observations have been made concerning the- "reasonable probability of a
different outcome" standard that the Court has made part of the prima facie showing
needed to establish various constitutional violations. See, e.g., United States v. Bagley,
473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695 (1984); United
States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 874 (1982).
134 See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text. See also McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct.
1454 (1991) (generally limiting capital defendants to one round of federal habeas
corpus review by presuming that successive habeas petition is abuse of the writ and
establishing stringent "cause and prejudice" standard for rebutting the presumption of
abuse).
135 Some lower courts, without serious analysis, have held that Lockett error can be
excused as harmless if the mitigating evidence precluded was unimpressive or if the
evidence weighing against the defendant was overwhelming. See Demps v. Dugger, 874
F.2d 1385 (11 th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1834 (1990); Tafero v. Dugger, 873
F.2d 249 (11 th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1834 (1990); Clark v. Dugger, 834 F.2d
1561 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 482 (1988); Smith v. Dugger, 529 So.2d 679
(Fla. 1988); Booker v. Dugger, 520 So.2d 246 (Fla.), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1061 (1988).
The North Carolina Supreme Court has expressed the opinion that Lockett error may be
harmless, but only if no mitigating evidence in fact was precluded. See State v. McNeil,
327 N.C. 388, 395 S.E.2d 106 (1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1403 (1991); see also State v.
Laws, 328 N.C. 550, 402 S.E.2d 573 (1991) (finding harmless error in such circum-
stances); State v. Roper, 328 N.C. 337, 402 S.E.2d 600 (1991) (same). As observed
earlier, see supra note 131, this approach is not the broad "harmless error" analysis which
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The Court would be well advised, however, to resist the tempta-
tion to remodel Lockett. Any modification of the Lockett doctrine
aimed at making its protections turn upon a case-specific actual prej-
udice inquiry - whether by redefining "mitigating evidence" to ex-
clude items not thought to be very persuasive, or by holding Lockett
violations subject to Chapman's harmless error analysis - would
mean that some risks of moral error now deemed unacceptable
under Lockett would become acceptable. The certain result would be
that more lives would be taken in moral error. None of the institu-
tional interests which might be asserted to justify changing Lockett,
such as limiting friction between state and federal courts, or enhanc-
ing the law's clarity and predictability, is strong enough to warrant
increasing the number of immoral executions. In addition, Lockett is
carefully structured to minimize judicial differences of opinion in its
application. Tinkering with Lockett inevitably will dim its bright
lines, thereby increasing opportunities for confusion and disagree-
ment between state and federal reviewing judges.
The argument that treating Lockett errors as automatically re-
versible will unduly burden the states by requiring a full-fledged re-
sentencing hearing whenever a death sentence is found to be tainted
by constitutional error is unpersuasive. The Supreme Court, in
Clemons v. Mississippi,13 6 recently announced general approval of an
alternative procedure for remedying constitutional violations in cap-
ital sentencing. Clemons allows state lawmakers to empower their ap-
pellate courts not only to review the legality of a death sentence, but
also to serve as the resentencer in cases where the original death sen-
tence imposed at trial by a sentencing judge or jury is found to be
constitutionally infirm. Rather than remanding the case for a new
hearing before a trial-level sentencer, the appellate court may itself
perform the requisite resentencing by "reweighing" the facts and
determining the morally appropriate sentence. The Clemons Court
found appellate "reweighing" constitutionally permissible because
appellate judges, despite their distance from live testimony, are not
inherently incapable of providing the reliable individualized sen-
tencing determinations mandated by the eighth amendment.13 7
courts often undertake pursuant to Chapman; it involves no judicial inquiry concerning
how the jury would have decided the case had it been permitted to consider a different
mix of mitigating evidence than it actually did.
136 110 S. Ct. 1441 (1990).
137 1d at 1448-49. In Clemons, the constitutional error involved the failure to ade-
quately limit the jury's discretion to find the aggravating factor that the crime was "espe-
cially heinous, atrocious, or cruel." Had the error not occurred, it is possible that the
jury might have decided the case differently. The jury had been instructed to balance
the aggravating and mitigating factors to determine the appropriate punishment; its de-
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Thus, each state may make its own decision regarding whether to
allow appellate-level resentencing. A state's decision in favor of ap-
pellate resentencing will be respected by the federal courts. 138
Of course, appellate court resentencing is subject to significant
qualifications both explicit and implicit. When a state appellate
court undertakes to "reweigh" the facts of a case and make a moral
appropriateness determination, its sentencing decision - no less
than the decision of any other capital sentencer - must inspire the
heightened degree of confidence required by the evolving standards
of decency that inform the eighth amendment. The state appellate
court, when acting as capital sentencer, must therefore comply with
all the rules designed to ensure an individualized and reliable sen-
tencing decision. These rules include the Lockett requirement that
the sentencer be willing and able to consider and give effect to all
mitigating evidence.13 9
termination thus may have been affected by the presence of the unconstitutional aggra-
vating factor. Indeed, the prosecutor in final argument had urged the jury to weigh the
unconstitutional factor heavily.
AsJustice Blackmun's opinion for the dissenting justices recognizes, it is child's play
to extend the majority's reasoning in Clemons to a wide range of constitutional errors that
might taint a jury's or trial judge's sentencing decision. Indeed, Clemons' reasoning sup-
ports the idea that an appellate court could be the one and only capital sentencer. "The
logical implication of the majority's approach is that no trial-level sentencing procedure
need be conducted at all" - save to the extent necessary to develop an evidentiary
record for the appellate court to use as the basis for its sentencing decision. Id. at 1457
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Barring some unforeseeable
change in the Court's course, it appears that Lockett violations will not be categorically
exempt from being remedied through appellate "reweighing." But see infra text accom-
panying notes 139-40.
138 The Supreme Court's general approval of appellate resentencing or "reweighing"
in Clemons should not be interpreted as an endorsement of the wisdom of the procedure
as a legislative policy. See Clemons, 110 S. Ct. at 1451 ("Nothing in this opinion is in-
tended to convey the impression that state appellate courts are required to or necessar-
ily should engage in reweighing... when errors have occurred in a capital sentencing
proceeding.").
In addition, for the benefit of federal reviewing courts, states must be unambiguous
about the role their appellate courts play when they find a trial-level sentencing decision
to be unconstitutional. State appellate courts must make clear whether they are merely
reviewing the legality of a capital sentence, or making an independent assessment of the
morally appropriate sentence in a given case. All doubts are resolved in the defendant's
favor. Id. at 1450-51 (since unclear whether state court performed appellate "reweigh-
ing" or instead performed harmless error analysis, a showing that the state court errone-
ously performed either is sufficient to warrant reversal and remand for further
proceedings). See also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 119 (1982) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (when there is "any legitimate basis" for finding ambiguity concerning
whether sentencer complied with eighth amendment, death sentence may not be
affirmed).
139 Clemons, 110 S. Ct. at 1450 (reversal and remand required since, assuming the state
appellate court was "reweighing," the Supreme Court "cannot be sure that the court
fully heeded our cases emphasizing the importance of the sentencer's consideration of a
324 [Vol. 82
THE LOCKET DOCTRINE
In addition, Clemons' logic dictates that appellate "reweighing"
alone may not be used to remedy constitutional errors which can
only be corrected through further resort to trial-level evidentiary
processes. For example, a Lockett error occurs if a capital defendant
is prevented from presenting mitigating evidence at trial. This error
cannot be remedied by appellate "reweighing" alone, however, be-
cause the error has adversely affected the trial record. The appel-
late court, like the trial-level sentencer, is unable to consider all
mitigating evidence, and therefore is equally unable to render a
morally reliable sentencing decision. The error can only be cured
by giving the defendant an opportunity to introduce and develop
the excluded mitigating evidence and argue its significance to the
sentencer. In contrast, consider a case in which the trial judge in-
structed the sentencing jury to disregard mitigating evidence that
was presented and stressed in defense counsel's final argument.
This Lockett error did not adversely affect the trial record. An appel-
late court, under Clemons, could remedy this error by performing ap-
pellate "reweighing," provided the court fully considered and was
free to give effect to the mitigating evidence that the jury was in-
structed to disregard.
Although the Court found no need to address the point in Clem-
ons, a strong argument can be made that the eighth and fourteenth
amendments impose a final qualification on appellate resentencing
by prohibiting such resentencing unless the defendant receives fair
notice before trial that appellate resentencing is the state's policy.
Due process, as well as the need for heightened reliability in capital
sentencing, counsel that government reveal the identity of the insti-
tution that will serve as the ultimate sentencer and the form of the
record that the sentencer will consider before a defendant is asked
to present his or her case in defense or in mitigation.140
Given Lockett's clarity and ease of application, and given the
considerable latitude that states now enjoy under Clemons to remedy
defendant's mitigating evidence"). See also Parker v. Dugger, 111 S. Ct. 731, 739-40
(1991) (for appellate court to "reweigh" in accordance with Clemons, it cannot disregard
mitigating circumstances found by the trial-level sentencer unless it "come[s] to its own
independent factual conclusion" after conducting its own "independent review" of the
evidence in compliance with Lockett).
In Clemons, the Supreme Court intimated that certain aspects of the appellate pro-
cess that distinguish it from the trial'process might pose challenges to an appellate court
seeking to comply with Lockett. However, the justices left the exploration of those intri-
cacies for another day. See 110 S. Ct. at 1451.
140 See Coleman v. McCormick, 874 F.2d 1280, 1288 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 349 (1989) ("defendant is due at least that amount of process which enables




Lockett violations, there is simply no need to tamper with Lockett. To
be sure, even after Clemons federal judges may well still find them-
selves in the unenviable position of having to enforce doctrines like
Lockett against a less than fully willing sovereign power. But the
blame will belong with the constitutional violators and not the con-
stitution as it has been interpreted.
VI. DUAL PRINCIPLES AND THE WAGES OF INTERPRETING AND
ENFORCING A CONSTITUTION
For a while, the Supreme Court's endorsement of the Lockett
doctrine appeared unanimous. In 1987, the justices delivered a 9-0
opinion - a rare sighting for Court watchers these days - that va-
cated a death sentence for failure to comply with Lockett princi-
ples. 14 1  Since then, however, differences of opinion have
materialized in every case directly or indirectly raising a Lockett ques-
tion. Until most recently, the disagreements concerned the extent
of the doctrine's reach rather than the doctrine's essential integ-
rity.' 42 Not anymore. In a concurring opinion in Walton v. Ari-
zona, 143 Justice Scalia brought the 1989 Term to a close by
announcing that he favored overruling not only Lockett, but also one
of the foundational constitutional principles accepted by the Court
since the 1976 Woodson decision. "I will not, in this case or in the
future, vote to uphold an Eighth Amendment claim that the sen-
tencer's discretion has been unlawfully restricted," Justice Scalia
declared. 144
Justice Scalia's quarrel with the Lockett doctrine, and with discre-
tionary capital sentencing in general, is not that they fail to accom-
plish their goal - helping to ensure reliable moral determinations
in capital sentencing. Scalia makes no claim that under Woodson and
Lockett morally inappropriate death sentences are being imposed, or
that morally appropriate death sentences are being withheld im-
properly. To judge from Justice Scalia's concurrence in Walton,
there is no problem with Woodson and Lockett in the judicial forums
plainly regarded by the Court as mattering the most - the trial
courts where the life and death decisions must be made in the first
141 Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987).
142 See Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047 (1990); Clemons v. Mississippi, 110 S. Ct.
1441 (1990); Saffle v. Parks, 110 S. Ct. 1257 (1990);McKoy v. North Carolina, 110 S. Ct.
1227 (1990); Boyde v. California, 110 S. Ct. 1190 (1990); Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 110
S. Ct. 1078 (1990); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989); Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487
U.S. 164 (1988); Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988); Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66
(1987).
'43 110 S. Ct. 3047 (1990).




What, then, is Justice Scalia's concern? Scalia's challenge to
Woodson and Lockett rests upon the following proposition: The prin-
ciple of Woodson and Lockett, that there must be discretion in capital
sentencing, is fundamentally irreconcilable with the principle of
Furman and its progeny that there must be rationality and orderli-
ness in capital sentencing. In Scalia's mind, these two principles are
locked in mortal combat:
To acknowledge that "there perhaps is an inherent tension" between
th[e] line of cases [represented by Woodson and Lockett] and the line
stemming from Furman... is rather like saying that there was perhaps
an inherent tension between the Allies and the Axis Powers in World
War I. And to refer to the two lines as pursuing "twin objectives,"...
is rather like referring to the twin objectives of good and evil. They
cannot be reconciled.146
There is not enough room in one legal world for both of these
principles,Justice Scalia contends, because "[t]he simultaneous pur-
suit of contradictory objectives necessarily produces confusion" in
the state and federal appellate courts that review the procedural
propriety of death sentences. 14
Justice Scalia's criticism stands upon a faulty premise that
reveals either a genuine misappreciation of the principles at issue or
a critic's exercise of rhetorical overstatement. The eighth amend-
ment is not at war with itself. The principle promoted by Woodson
and Lockett mandates that the sentencer must have discretion in or-
der to correctly determine the death penalty's moral appropriate-
ness in a particular case. The principle advanced by Furman and its
progeny requires that the potential for arbitrary or capricious re-
sults in capital sentencing must be minimized - but not at the ex-
pense of the" discretion necessary to ensure a morally appropriate
sentence. As explained in Part Three of this article, nothing in the
formulation or application of these principles renders them logically
irreconcilable. As any trial judge can attest, both law and logic rec-
ognize that discretion may be required at the same time that de-
mands are made to minimize the risks associated with abuses of that
discretion. The trial bench works with and applies this dynamic
145 See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977) ("[Ihe trial of a criminal
case in state court [should be perceived] as a decisive and portentous event.... To the
greatest extent possible all issues which bear on this charge should be determined in this
proceeding.").
146 Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3063 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judg-
ment) (quoting first McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 363 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting), and then Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 459 (1984)).
147 Id at 3064 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
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every day. 148 Justice Scalia's implicit and incorrect assumption is
that the discretion which Woodson and Lockett protect is an unfet-
tered, standardless discretion. Such unfettered discretion would be
at odds with Furman. The sentencer's discretion under Woodson and
Lockett, however, is the limited and structured discretion to give a
life sentence because of moral considerations arising from mitigat-
ing evidence, not the discretion "to make the sentencing decision
according to .. .whims or caprice." 149
Justice Scalia is quite right to think that simultaneously satisfy-
ing the eighth amendment's two central principles requires vigilance
on the part of states which employ capital punishment. The "un-
wary" state, Justice Scalia complains, may find itself in constitutional
default because the overindulgence of one of these principles easily
can result in a constitutionally insufficient regard for the other prin-
ciple.' 50 This observation standing alone, however, does not indict
the Court's capital punishment jurisprudence under Furman, Wood-
son and Lockett. Nowhere is it written that a state has a right to be
unwary of the Constitution's demands, particularly when the state
seeks to take the life of one of its citizens. If it could be demon-
strated that even vigilant states are unable to design capital sen-
tencing schemes that accommodate both principles - a showing, in
short, that the Supreme Court has failed to articulate the eighth
amendment's dual principles clearly and workably - then there
might be cause to believe that something is constitutionally amiss.
Justice Scalia levels the necessary accusation, asserting that the
states lack guidance in applying capital punishment. "For state
lawmakers," he contends, "the lesson has been that a [capital pun-
ishment] decision of this Court is nearly worthless as a guide for the
future; though we approve or seemingly even require some sentenc-
ing procedure today, we may well retroactively prohibit it to-
148 See, e.g., Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447 (1990) (trial judges
retain discretion to tailor appropriate sanctions under Rule 11, but that discretion is
necessarily abused ifjudge operates under misapprehension of law or clearly erroneous
assessment of facts); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (prosecutors retain broad
discretion to use peremptory challenges, but procedures must exist to guard against
abuse of discretion in form of racial discrimination). Even where discretion is virtually
unfettered (which, I suggest, is not true of a capital sentencer's discretion to respond to
mitigating evidence), "[a]n official's discretion means not that he is free to decide with-
out recourse to standards of sense and fairness." R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERI-
OUSLY 33 (1978).
149 Saffle v. Parks, 110 S. Ct. 1257, 1263 (1990). See also California v. Brown, 479 U.S.
538, 543 (1987).
150 Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3068 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judg-
ment) ("[T]he Woodson-Lockett principle... contradict[s] the basic thrust of much of our
death penalty jurisprudence, laying traps for unwary States, and generating a fundamen-
tal uncertainty in the law that shows no signs of ending or even diminishing.").
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morrow."1 51 But even allowing for hyperbole, the facts do not
substantiate Justice Scalia's charge. As the discussion in Part Four
of this article demonstrates, the Lockett doctrine is unclear only to
those who want it that way.
t 52
Perhaps Justice Scalia's failure of proof explains why no other
justice joined him in his Walton concurrence. There may be a more
rudimentary reason, though, for his solitary position in Walton. Jus-
tice Scalia's strong distaste for uncertainty and indeterminacy in
constitutional law is becoming increasingly apparent as his tenure
on the Court advances, and it is a matter of judicial style and tem-
151 Id. at 3065 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
152 It bears noting that Justice Scalia's vision of innocent, well-meaning states being
victimized by erratic Supreme Court jurisprudence is not established by the three ills-
trations he employs in Walton - the alleged about-faces represented by Hitchcock v.
Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987), McKoy v. North Carolina, 110 S. Ct. 1227 (1990), and
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989). See Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3065 (ScaliaJ., concur-
ring in part and concurring in judgment).
Florida officials may not have been happy with the Hitchcock decision, in which the
Court concluded that the sentencing judge had operated under the unconstitutional be-
lief that he could consider at sentencing only those mitigating factors specified by stat-
ute. But the officials could not have been surprised by Hitchcock. The Court's
unanimous opinion (authored by Justice Scalia) convincingly shows that it "could not be
clearer" that the case was controlled by Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) - a prece-
dent on the books well before the Florida Supreme Court affirmed Hitchcock's sentence
in 1982. See Hitchcock, 481 U.S. at 398-99. Moreover, the Florida Supreme Court al-
ready had acknowledged Lockett's controlling influence on cases like Hitchcock before the
Supreme Court announced its Hitchcock decision. See Skene, Review of Capital Cases: Does
the Florida Supreme Court Know What It's Doing ?, 15 S=soN L. REv. 263, 281-84 (1986).
Similarly, North Carolina officials dare not claim surprise in the McKoy decision,
which held unconstitutional a rule requiring every juror to disregard mitigating evidence
unless all twelve jurors unanimously agreed that the evidence constituted a mitigating
factor. Seven years before McKoy was decided, the North Carolina attorney general con-
ceded to the state supreme court that the rule in question contravened Lockett and urged
the state court to so hold. See State v. McKoy, 323 N.C. 1, 50, 372 S.E.2d 12, 42 (1988)
(Exum, C.J., dissenting), rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 1227 (1990).
OfJustice Scalia's cited exAmples, only Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), ar-
guably supports his point. The support is not very strong, however, as the majority
opinion in Penry demonstrates. 'In Penry, a divided Court held that the Texas sentencing
scheme found facially constitutional inJurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976), was applied
unconstitutionally when it operated to preclude full consideration of certain mitigating
evidence proffered by the defendant. It should take a lot more than one debatably bad
apple to convince us that the whole bunch is spoiled.
Even if Justice Scalia were factually correct in suggesting that the states running
afoul of Lockett almost always do so in good-faith reliance upon other Supreme Court
decisions, it does not follow necessarily that the Court has erred in interpreting the
Constitution. A state's interest in the finality of death sentences imposed in good faith
before the announcement of a new capital punishment ruling is adequately protected by
a general bar on the retroactive application of the new ruling in habeas corpus. See supra
note 2. Respect for the finality ofjudgments can be had without freezing the substantive
constitutional law in perpetuity.
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perament that sets him apart from the rest of the Court.15 3 It is not
surprising to find Justice Scalia expressing discontent with per-
ceived uncertainties and indeterminacies that most of the justices
accept as necessary incidents of responsible constitutional
adjudication.
Those who are familiar with constitutional adjudication can ap-
preciate the Court's interpretive difficulties in dealing with clauses
as spacious as the eighth amendment. To the eternal frustration of
those who seek determinate rules of decision, the Constitution is a
grand and intensely political document which sometimes communi-
cates only at the level of broad and sweeping principle and is fre-
quently less than crystal clear about the contours of the principles it
evokes. The fourth amendment's command that "[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,"
for instance, speaks with a generality that defies immediate rule-like
application, and with an expansiveness that supports a number of
potentially competing principles and interests.154 Given the limits
of human knowledge and the national importance of reaching the
best possible results, it is no wonder that the Supreme Court occa-
sionally places a premium upon its ability to remain flexible and re-
sponsive. The Court's familiar "balancing" approach to most
fourth amendment issues is a vivid doctrinal manifestation of this
desire for flexibility. 155
153 Justice Scalia's penchant for imparting determinate meaning to fundamentally in-
determinate text, insisting all along that the meaning he has divined is in no sense per-
sonally supplied, is thoughtfully explored in Kannar, The Constitutional Catechism of
Antonin Scalia, 99 YALE L.J. 1297 (1990). See also Gelfand & Werhan, Federalism and Sepa-
ration of Powers on a Conservative Court: Currents and Cross-Currents from Justices O'Connor and
Scalia, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1443, 1460-63 (1990). For some representative opinions that
evidence the point, see Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3176 (1990) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) (sixth amendment's confrontation clause so interpreted), Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S.
1012, 1016 (1988) (per Scalia, J.) (same), Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047, 3066-67
(1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) ("cruel and unusual"
language of eighth amendment so interpreted), and Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361,
370-73 (1989) (plurality opinion of Scalia, J.) (same).
154 See generally Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 742 (1982).
There is no shortage of recent scholarship exploring the fundamentally indeterminate
nature of the Constitution's provisions relating to individual rights. See, e.g., D'Amato,
Aspects of Deconstruction: The "Easy Case" of the Under-Aged President, 84 Nw. U.L. REv. 250
(1990); Carter, Constitutional Adjudication and Indeterminate Text: A Preliminary Defense of an
Imperfect Muddle, 94 YALE L.J. 821 (1985); Tushnet, The Dilemmas of Liberal Constitutional-
ism, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 411 (1981).
155 The fourth amendment makes a fine example because it stumps the very best who
deny the Constitution's indeterminate nature. Even Justice Scalia has to shrug when he
reads the fourth amendment. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489
U.S. 656, 681 (1989) (ScaliaJ., dissenting) ("While there are some absolutes in Fourth
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Does a balancing approach concede the existence of a profound
textual indeterminacy? Surely. Does it produce a considerable
measure of doctrinal uncertainty? Most definitely. Is it disruptive of
American constitutional order? Of course not. Clear rules from the
Supreme Court doubtless have their virtues. As the justices draw
brighter and brighter lines, the judicial and law enforcement sys-
tems theoretically should operate more smoothly. In addition, ac-
cepting the reasonable but hard-to-prove assumption that
constitutional grey areas impede legislators, administrators and ju-
rists, politics and federalism theoretically should flourish when the
Court makes definitive rulings. The Court's own apparent legiti-
macy may also be enhanced when it speaks in an assertive, rule-like
tongue. But these virtues have limitations. Prudence, if not
humility, sometimes demands tolerance of doctrinal uncertainty in
constitutional law in order to achieve full benefit from the Constitu-
tion. It is not always better that the law be settled today than that it
be settled correctly in the end.
Since at least 1972, the majority of the Court has adopted a
slow, relatively patient approach to constitutional exposition in the
capital punishment context. A perspective that tolerates some inde-
terminacy and uncertainty and candidly views constitutional inter-
pretation as an evolutionary process has prevailed. 156 Rather than
Amendment law, as soon as those have been left behind and the question comes down
to whether a particular search has been 'reasonable,' the answer depends largely upon
the social necessity that prompts the search."). See also Kannar, supra note 153, at 1339.
156 The Court's acceptance of this perspective helps explain the celebrated volte-face
made by the Court from McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971), to Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
In McGautha, the Court found no due process violation in giving a jury unbridled
discretion to sentence a murderer to death, even as it acknowledged "the undeniable
surface appeal of the proposition" that such unbridled discretion is "fundamentally law-
less." 402 U.S. at 196. The way to address the formal lawlessness of unbridled discre-
tion, Justice Harlan reasoned for the majority, would be to articulate and apply
identifiable standards. Any standards that could truly regularize capital sentencing,
however, would have to embody fairly discrete and narrow norms; such narrow stan-
dards inevitably would be morally unsatisfactory. Requiring such standards as a matter
of federal constitutional mandate, Justice Harlan thus concluded for the majority, would
not be worth the candle. kd at 207.
Less than fourteen months later, the Court in Furman struck down the very same
unbridled discretion schemes under the eighth amendment. Neither the brief passage
of time, nor a change in the Court's personnel, nor the use of a different constitutional
provision persuasively explains the change in course from McGautha to Furman. The
Court's center (Justices Stewart and White being the swing votes) apparently revised its
estimate of the feasibility of an evolutionary approach to constitutional death penalty
adjudication. I doubt thatJustice Stewart andJustice White underwent tumultuous phil-
osophical sea-changes in just over a year. But it seems fair to conclude that they and the
rest of the Furman majority became persuaded that forcing the states back to the drawing
board was a responsible and profitable thing to do. Perhaps they recognized that un-
LOUIS D. BILIONIS
attempting to "solve" capital punishment's constitutional status for
all time by forcing clean and definitive answers out of broad consti-
tutional language, the justices instead have engaged in continuing
self-education about the institution of capital punishment and about
the Constitution's impact on society's use of this ultimate penal
sanction. Justice Brennan portrayed the Court's eighth amendment
capital punishment odyssey so:
The process of trying to resolve such a momentous constitutional is-
sue is often a dynamic one, with positions of the justices changing as
arguments are made, theories advanced, and authorities marshaled.
The path.., weaves and winds as one might expect, given the overrid-
ing importance of the issues and the apparent elusiveness of standards
with which to decide them.
1 57
Now is no time to abandon either the tradition of patience that
has marked the Court's eighth amendment capital punishment juris-
prudence or any of the doctrines which that tradition has nurtured.
With every day, the path weaves and winds less.
VII. CONCLUSION
The lament that eighth amendment capital punishment juris-
prudence is complex, confused and marred by deep division among
the justices is not an unfamiliar one. 58 But the doctrine of Lockett v.
Ohio is clear, workable, and firmly grounded upon a coherent vision
of what the decision to sentence a human being to death must entail.
Lockett and its progeny affirm that we as a society do not kill in the
name of punishment unless we are sincerely confident that our ac-
tion is moral. We owe that fundamental measure of decency not
only to those we condemn to death, but to ourselves. "[T]he way in
which we choose those who will die reveals the depth of moral com-
leashing the states' creative energies could result in fresh blueprints for bringing ra-
tional orderliness and the rule of law to death penalty jurisprudence without sacrificing
the respect and concern for morality that formed the basis ofJustice Harlan's McGautha
opinion. They also might have foreseen a more subtle benefit that would accrue from
the instigation of institutional reform. By asking the states to revisit the issue of capital
punishment through their political and judicial processes, the Court created a dynamic
that provided timely (although potentially ambiguous, see supra note 34) information
about the evolving standards of decency that give content to the eighth amendment. See
Tao, Beyond Furman v. Georgia: The Need for a Morally Based Decision on Capital Punishment,
51 NOTRE DAME LAw. 722, 722, 725 (1976). To be sure, the Court had to track the
uncertain twists and turns of institutional reform and periodically assess its marginal
costs and benefits. Such tasks, however, are not beyond the capacity of the Court and
the judicial method.
157 Brennan, supra note 38, at 316.
158 See, e.g., Acker & Walsh, Challenging the Death Penalty Under State Constitutions, 42
Vand. L. Rev. 1299, 1341 & n.201 (1989); Burt, Disorder in the Court: The Death Penalty and
the Constitution, 85 MIcH. L. REV. 1741, 1781-82 (1987).
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mitment among the living."' 5 9
159 McGleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 344 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
